


CIVIL AFFAIRS HISTORY AND DOCTRINE: FROM MILITARY  
GOVERNMENT TO INTERAGENCY PARTNER



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## ABSTRACT

CIVIL AFFAIRS HISTORY AND DOCTRINE: FROM MILITARY GOVERNMENT TO INTERAGENCY PARTNER, by MAJ Thomas R. Geisinger, 120 pages.

The Army has always had an obligation to safeguard civilians on the battlefield, minimize human suffering, and maintain order in territory it occupies. In the early history of the Army this requirement was completely at the discretion of a field commander within the laws of war. Seeing the large-scale military-led reconstruction efforts required after both World Wars, the Army created a Civil Affairs (CA)/Military Government capability that, because of its low priority for peacetime training and readiness, has historically been unprepared to fulfill its duties, which naturally accompany modern warfare. These missions have gradually given way to a civilian-led methodology of development for which Army CA is not currently optimized.

Through a series of doctrinal and historical evolutions, CA has evolved into a primarily interagency tool for achieving U.S. strategic goals in threatened states under U.S. diplomatic control.

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## TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE THESIS APPROVAL PAGE .....	iii
ABSTRACT.....	iv
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS .....	v
TABLE OF CONTENTS.....	vi
ACRONYMS .....	viii
ILLUSTRATIONS .....	x
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION .....	1
The Problem.....	5
Research Questions.....	6
Limitations .....	7
Scope and Delimitations .....	9
Conclusion .....	9
CHAPTER 2 DOCTRINAL FOUNDATIONS OF CIVIL AFFAIRS.....	11
Field Service Regulations, 1905 to 1923 .....	12
Modern Civil Affairs Regiment .....	20
CHAPTER 3 HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CIVIL AFFAIRS .....	27
The Pre-Modern Era of Civil Affairs.....	27
The American Civil War, and the Beginning of the Hard War Era.....	31
Native American Relations .....	33
The World Wars and Large-Scale Military Government .....	34
Korea.....	40
Vietnam, and a Shift to Unconventional Warfare and Interagency Focus .....	41
CHAPTER 4 MODERN CIVIL AFFAIRS .....	45
Current Civil Affairs Training .....	48
An Interagency Perspective on Civil Military Engagement .....	50
CHAPTER 5 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY .....	53
CHAPTER 6 ANALYSIS .....	57

CHAPTER 7 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS .....	69
Recommendations.....	74
Summary .....	77
GLOSSARY .....	79
APPENDIX A CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN A RESEARCH SURVEY.....	81
APPENDIX B INTERVIEW QUESTIONS FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES CIVIL AFFAIRS TEAM MEMBERS .....	84
APPENDIX C INTERVIEW QUESTIONS FOR DEPARTMENT OF STATE AND U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PERSONNEL .....	86
APPENDIX D U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND DEPARTMENT OF STATE INTERVIEW RESPONSES.....	88
APPENDIX E SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES CIVIL AFFAIRS INTERVIEW RESPONSES .....	101
BIBLIOGRAPHY .....	104

## ACRONYMS

AC	Active Component
AOC	Army Operating Concept
ARSOF	Army Special Operations Forces
ATP	Army Techniques Publication
CA	Civil Affairs
CAO	Civil Affairs Operations
CAQC	Civil Affairs Qualification Course
CME	Civil Military Engagement
CMO	Civil-Military Operations
CMSE	Civil Military Support Element
COCOM	Combatant Command
CORDS	Civil Operations Revolutionary Development Support
DoD	Department of Defense
DoS	Department of State
FID	Foreign Internal Defense
FM	Field Manual
FSR	Field Service Regulation
IMSG	Institute for Support to Military Governance
MG	Military Government
MOS	Military Occupational Specialty
NCO	Non-commissioned Officer
NGO	Nongovernmental Organization
RC	Reserve Component

SMG	School of Military Government
SO	Special Operations
SOC-FWD	Special Operations Command-Forward
SOF	Special Operations Forces
SWCS	Special Warfare Center and School
TSOC	Theater Special Operations Command
USACAPOC	U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command
USAID	U.S. Agency for International Development
USASOC	U.S. Army Special Operations Command
USG	U.S. Government
USSOCOM	U.S. Special Operations Command
UW	Unconventional Warfare

## ILLUSTRATIONS

	Page
Figure 1. Range of Military Operations .....	20
Figure 2. Structure of Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support, May 1967 .....	44
Figure 3. Approaches for Combating Terrorism.....	46
Figure 4. Civil Military Engagement in Phase 0.....	47
Figure 5. Comparison of Active-duty and Reserve Component Civil Affairs Officer Training Pathway by Subject and Student Contact Hours, 2016.....	64
Figure 6. Comparison of Active-duty and Reserve Component Civil Affairs Officer Training Pathway by Training Weeks, 2016 .....	66
Figure 7. Seventh Warfighting Function.....	73

## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION

Our military is postured globally to protect our citizens and interests, preserve regional stability, render humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, and build the capacity of our partners to join with us in meeting security challenges. U.S. forces will continue to . . . conduct global counterterrorism operations, assure allies, and deter aggression through forward presence and engagement.

— U.S. President, *National Security Strategy*

The 2014 U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1, *The U.S. Army Operating Concept: Win in a Complex World 2020-2040*. stresses the need for American military power to prevent conflict and shape future wars as much as win them.<sup>1</sup> To do this, U.S. forces must take advantage of joint and interagency capabilities across multiple domains and create unprecedented levels of coordination between its instruments of national power. The Army Operating Concept (AOC) therefore emphasizes the need to develop “foundational capabilities that permit effective integration of military, interorganizational, and multinational efforts.”<sup>2</sup>

While peer and near-peer threats remain the most dangerous consideration in preparing for future warfare, a lower-intensity conflict like the one against the Islamic State in the Levant is historically more likely. Such conflicts tend to be population-centric and rely upon a mixture of hard and soft power as well as the cooperation of the Department of State (DoS) and Department of Defense (DoD).

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<sup>1</sup> Headquarters, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, Training and Doctrine Pamphlet 525-3-1, *The U.S. Army Operating Concept: Win in a Complex World 2020-2040* (Fort Eustis, VA: Government Printing Office, 2014), Foreword.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

The U.S. Army Civil Affairs (CA) regiment is a key asset in this series of low-intensity conflicts. CA teams provide a supported U.S. country team or military commander with the ability to stabilize threatened areas, develop productive relationships with key leaders in the civil society in a host nation, and positively impact the perception of U.S. forces and partnered governments. CA is a vital tool in a modern interagency effort to develop relationships with local leaders, act as an implementer for development projects, and further U.S. diplomatic objectives. Unfortunately, the present-day CA regiment still maintains a number of vestigial structures and doctrines from its historical mission responsibilities of Military Government (MG) that render it less effective in the modern security environment. CA Reserve Component (RC) forces are primarily designed to execute MG missions, with a heavy force mix of specialists in functional roles such as rule of law and public education. Active Component (AC) CA forces are generalists who support Special Operations (SO) missions and receive a much lengthier regimen of language, culture, and tactical training.

How did the Army's CA capability evolve to meet these current security requirements? This thesis will demonstrate that military philosophy regarding civilians on the battlefield, martial law, and stability operations has undergone significant change throughout American history, and that CA/MG doctrine has not traditionally fit within the prevailing concept and doctrine of U.S. Army warfighting. Beginning from an army that never expected to fight off the American continent, this thesis argues CA has evolved in five general movements, which will be explained in further detail in chapter 6.

Today, Civil Military Engagement (CME) is the primary mission of the AC CA force. Though this is the most prudent application given the present national security

strategy, CME is a significant departure from historical CA missions. Traditionally, civil considerations fell under the purview of a combat commander and his staff. For the U.S. Army, this state of affairs only officially changed when it took on the mission of governing millions of people in liberated and occupied territories. Though Civil Affairs Operations (CAO) are now seen as a natural component of military operations (particularly during Phase IV, or stability operations), the Army came only reluctantly to that conclusion. The mobilization required for victory in World Wars I and II, and the size of the occupied and liberated populations in Europe and Asia, compelled the Army to create a MG apparatus of unprecedented size and capability. A smaller MG mission in Korea from 1945 to 1948 receives much less popular attention, but was still successful in bringing a transition from Japanese Imperial occupation to democratic rule, however short-lived.<sup>3</sup> In the periods after each of the World Wars, the Army lost interest in the details of governing occupied territory and attempted to distance itself from the subject. The postwar edition of the *Field Services Regulations* (FSR) removed the few paragraphs dedicated to MG, leaving only some excerpts of the Laws of War and Geneva Convention of 1906.<sup>4</sup> The change may have been a deliberate attempt not to acknowledge the fact that U.S. troops were committed to the post-war occupation of the German Rhineland from the cessation of hostilities in 1918 until 1923. After the Korean MG (and CA operations during the Korean War from 1950 to 1953), the Army began to doctrinally

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<sup>3</sup> Stanley Sandler, *Glad to See Them Come and Sorry to See Them Go: A History of U.S. Army Tactical Civil Affairs/Military Government, 1775-1991* (Fort Bragg, NC: U.S. Army Special Operations Command History and Archives Division, 1994), 308.

<sup>4</sup> U.S. Army, *Field Service Regulations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1923), 633.

divest itself of the term MG, placing it under the CA mission. Though the force would retain a CA capability within, the reserves after Korea (the first time the Army would maintain CA Soldiers during peacetime), their training and readiness levels would not allow them to contribute meaningfully to the 1965 intervention in the Dominican Republic and left them severely undermanned and underprepared for the conflict in Vietnam.

Since the establishment of the AC CA branch in 2006, CA teams have found a new utility augmenting U.S. diplomatic efforts through CME missions, with the aim of helping to prevent and deter conflict in failed and threatened states. Unfortunately, the history of CA doctrine and training do not correlate with its new means of peacetime employment.

Today, Title X U.S. Code enumerates ten core Special Operations Forces (SOF) activities. Though the CA regiment plays a supporting role in several core SOF activities, the fifth, CAO, specifically encompasses those operations conducted by CA forces that:

1. Enhance the relationship between military forces and civil authorities in localities where military forces are present.
2. Require coordination [with] other interagency, intergovernmental, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), indigenous populations and institutions and the private sector.
3. Involve application of functional specialty skills that normally [are] the responsibility of civil government to enhance the conduct of civil-military operations (CMO).

These duties involve employment of CA forces during all phases of conflict and throughout the range of military operations require CA forces to be highly flexible and rapidly deployable.

Historically, a lack of peacetime emphasis on CA training, and a disconnect with the Army's prevailing operating concepts has translated into an unprepared CA capability at the outset of conflict, and at the beginning of post-conflict stability operations. This research will outline selected cases from the history of CA training and doctrine, and analyze their effects in practice after the outbreak of conflict.

### The Problem

CA and MG are historically overlooked military functions in American history; such tasks usually fall to the Army when the need inevitably emerges after conflict. In the beginning of U.S. military history, administration of occupied areas and their populations fell to commanders as an additional duty; a brief overview of this pre-modern era of Army CA appears in chapter 2. Even after the realization that CA/MG specialists were required in the aftermath of World War I, the Army still showed an indifference toward the field. Because of this lack of foresight, Army CA forces are usually inadequately trained and equipped at the outset of conflict and at the beginning of stability operations, when the importance of CAO/CMO is greatest. This reluctance to commit resources to CA forces in advance of conflict has proven costly in the past. Further, CA training and doctrine has not historically been sufficient to meet wartime needs. After major combat operations in Iraq ended in 2003, the Army was ill-equipped to address the problems associated with MG, despite having a large number of units supposedly dedicated to the purpose. Deep cuts to CA training and readiness budgets in the 1970s through the 2000s

rendered the Army's CA force unprepared to assist with the Army's vast responsibilities in governing and stabilizing Iraq.

The present-day CA regiment (since its creation as an AC branch in 2006) is employed in a worldwide engagement mission which, while needed, represents a departure from its traditional role. The 2008 establishment of CME as a U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) program of record presaged a transition for the regiment to assume primarily Title XXII missions to support defense, development, and diplomatic objectives, aligned with national security guidance and the Army's current operating concept. While new CA doctrine has accounted for this shift in the form of an Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 3-57.80, *Civil Military Engagement*, the regiment as a whole is still not properly structured and trained for CME, particularly in the RC. Peacetime indifference to CA capabilities, and unpreparedness for stability operations will continue into the future unless the Army takes proactive measures to support its CA forces.

### Research Questions

The primary question this research seeks to answer is; how has the Army, and later the CA regiment, been historically prepared to carry out its responsibilities in MG and CA activities to support the overall mission? Additionally, this research will explore three secondary questions:

1. How has CA doctrine developed over time to meet anticipated challenges in administration of occupied zones, influencing local populations, and mitigating drivers of instability in host nations?

2. How have methods of CA training evolved to meet operational requirements, and how can it change its training methods to enhance performance in the field, especially in Title XXII engagement?
3. How has the relationship between CA and interagency partners such as the DoS and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) evolved and changed over time, and what lessons from this history can be applied to modern CA activities?

#### Limitations

The researcher is limited by previous personal experience as the leader of a CME mission in the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility, and the bias, conscious or not, that accompanies it. As a bias control measure, no in-depth study of CME in the country in question appears in this research, and primary sources were generated from outside the researcher's personal experience. The researcher also spent time as an instructor at the Special Warfare Center and School (SWCS) CA Qualification Course (CAQC) and has authored lesson plans. No lesson plan, Program of Instruction or other SWCS product written by the researcher appears in this thesis.

The SO CA community, under the auspices of the CME program, operates a large number of persistent missions. Each of these missions, subordinate to the operational control of the relevant U.S. Combatant Command (COCOM), operates in the way which best suits the needs of that commander as well as the U.S. ambassador to the assigned country. As a result, though the Title X authorities and directives under the CME program remain uniform, each CME mission assumes its own identity and practices.

With so many persistent missions, this research is limited in its ability to speak for the whole of the CME program.

This thesis contends that a high level of peacetime readiness and training for CA forces is necessary to ensure Army competence in stability operations after conflict. The researcher constructs these arguments by analyzing training and doctrine for both CA forces and the Army writ large over a long period of time. Depth is necessarily sacrificed for width and context; special emphasis is given to interwar periods, and cases where the Army has surged CA forces after the need emerges. This thesis is not intended to be a comprehensive history of Army CA. Additionally, what the Army professional of 2016 recognizes as prudent CMO was seen by commanders as simply an additional duty of a commander. “Civil Affairs” did not enter the Army lexicon until after World War I. Much of the history of Army CA must be translated into modern terms to fully incorporate lessons learned.

For purposes of brevity, this research will not contemplate CA/MG efforts of other nations, although there are a number of valuable historical examples. Comparison and contrast between American CA/MG activities and those of other powers through history may provide a worthy research topic for future theses.

Finally, some aspects of CA contributions to military operations are classified and unavailable for inclusion in this thesis. This is primarily true of missions conducted since the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, and the decision by the Secretary of

the Army the following year to include CA into the SO community.<sup>5</sup> Many SO missions in this period have not reached the requirements for declassification review under Executive Order 13526.<sup>6</sup>

### Scope and Delimitations

Though histories of U.S. Army CA activities are available, and those works sometimes discuss the doctrinal readiness of units for their mission, there is no comprehensive analysis of the evolution of CA training and doctrine through time. The scope of this paper is to assess CA training and doctrine and its effects. This research will attempt not to explore the same ground again, although concepts and sources may appear again to support new ideas. Additionally, the researcher will focus on present-day CA training and doctrine, and analyze its propriety for meeting the mission as set forth by the AOC. This analysis will include AC and RC CA training and doctrine, and will discuss joint and interagency compatibility.

### Conclusion

The CME program has become a cornerstone of the modern CA regiment, and has gained a great deal of experience operating in Title XXII zones and synchronizing defense, diplomatic, and development objectives. The emphasis placed on CME and

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<sup>5</sup> Bryan Brown, *United States Special Operations Command History, 1987-2007* (MacDill Air Force Base, FL: U.S. Special Operations Command History Office, 2007), accessed 13 March 2016, <https://fas.org/irp/agency/dod/socom/2007history.pdf>.

<sup>6</sup> Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, Executive Order 13526, *Classified National Security Information* (Washington, DC: The White House, 29 December 2009), accessed 13 March 2016, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/executive-order-classified-national-security-information>.

other engagement activities is recent, and a major departure from the traditional MG mission of Army CA, which began to disappear doctrinally in 1986.<sup>7</sup> Originally designed to form a part of a large-scale MG effort, CA units were “organized around specialist teams required to establish a political bureaucracy . . . the new mission of Civil Affairs forces states that they operate as part of Army forces in the theater of operation.”<sup>8</sup>

This thesis proposes that, despite the development of a standing CA branch after World War II, the Army has never allocated the necessary resources to CA training and readiness until after emergencies occur. The current interwar period has the potential to become the first instance of peacetime investment in trained and ready CA forces. Additionally, CA forces have not historically proven themselves capable of conducting MG or stability operations without heavy support or integration with civilian experts, from either other U.S. or international agencies, NGOs, or the academic community.

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<sup>7</sup> Headquarters, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, Training and Doctrine Command Pamphlet 525-31, *Operational Concept for Civil Affairs Operations* (Fort Monroe, VA: Government Printing Office, 1986), 1.

<sup>8</sup> Charles Faulkner, “Statement of Need for a Civil Affairs MOS,” U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, Fort Bragg, NC, 1989, Records of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command Historian, Collection 2007.14, Box 1, U.S. Army Special Operations Command Archives, Fort Bragg, NC.

## CHAPTER 2

### DOCTRINAL FOUNDATIONS OF CIVIL AFFAIRS

In order to assess whether Army CA has historically been prepared in peace to fulfill its wartime missions, it is essential to assess what emphasis the Army has placed on its officers and leaders understanding the human dimension of their operational environment. Historical CA capabilities have developed steadily over time to provide commanders with more options; but the relatively recent change in the Army's operating concept lends the CA regiment a larger role in persistent engagement. Further, the development of both staff officers and tactical teams specializing in local population engagement is essential to a modern expeditionary army. Lastly, the modern CA force has evolved in a way that emphasizes MG missions and specialty functions within Career Management Field 38. Most of the current force is therefore not optimized to conform to current national security guidance, which stresses functions like Security Forces Assistance, Foreign Internal Defense (FID), and persistent low-intensity engagement.

This research does not intend to ignore the existence of a large body of work on the history of Army CA/MG, both before and after the establishment of the Civil Affairs Division in 1943. MG has been a key component of American military involvement in conflicts of all size, from the Mexican War in 1846-1847, the Reconstruction period of the American Civil War, both World Wars, and the recent conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. The temporary administration of civil governments by military officers in occupied territory is “a virtually inevitable concomitant of modern warfare.”<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>9</sup> Earl Frederick Ziemke, *The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany: 1944-1946* (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, U.S. Army, 2003), 1.

### Field Service Regulations, 1905 to 1923

When assessing value in CME, there are useful lessons to draw from the history of the U.S. Army's doctrinal approach to CA/MG. The term first appears in the Army's 1905 FSR, which devotes four pages to the subject. The term was originally defined as the "suspension, by the occupying military authority, of the domestic administration and government in the place or territory occupied; in the substitution of military rule and for the same; and in the dictation of general laws, as far as military necessity requires this suspension, substitution, and dictation."<sup>10</sup> The term is carefully distinguished in the text from martial law and military oppression, and recommends less stringent rule in "fully occupied and passive" areas.<sup>11</sup> The 1910 version of the FSR reduced the portion to just over two pages (a short section under the chapter on law of war), removed the term MG, and focused almost exclusively on the rights of inhabitants in occupied territory. Commanders were to minimize damage to the population as far as possible, but discretion for occupational governance was entirely in the hands of the commander and his staff. The update did devote more space to a commander's obligations via international treaties; however, and the strong humanitarian bent of both the 1906 Geneva Convention (accepted by the U.S. government in August 1907) and The Hague Convention of 1907 appears in Army doctrine for the first time.<sup>12</sup> The Army also recognized the International Red Cross as a humanitarian entity with rights and privileges resembling a modern NGO.

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<sup>10</sup> U.S. Army, *Field Service Regulations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1905), 195.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid.

<sup>12</sup> U.S. Army, *Field Service Regulations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1910), 187.

The 1914 version added a new passage, noting that military police were responsible to “maintain order throughout the area or areas occupied by the organizations to which they have been assigned [and to] protect the inhabitants of the country and their property against violence, prevent excesses of all kinds.”<sup>13</sup>

The final FSR, in 1923, again made no substantive changes to the Army’s official view of civilians on the battlefield or the lawful occupation of enemy territory. Chartered by General John Pershing as a challenge to investigate and learn lessons from his experiences in France, the new manual dealt extensively with combined arms concepts such as breaching wire obstacles, countering chemical weapons attacks, and integrating the effects of aircraft, indirect fire, and armor.<sup>14</sup> Despite the marked advancement in American military intellectualism associated with the 1923 FSR, the Army did not contemplate its obligations after the cessation of major combat operations. The experience in the Rhineland from 1918 to 1923 was not entirely ignored—publications such as the *Hunt Report* helped to inform MG problems at the U.S. Army War College and the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in future years—but ultimately had no effect on Army doctrine.

The U.S. Army Command and General Staff College produced what could be called the first U.S. Army doctrine purely devoted to the subject, 1925’s *Military Aid to the Civil Authority*, which includes a detailed history of Army support to civil administration to date recommended techniques for tactical-level leaders in establishing

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<sup>13</sup> U.S. Army, *Field Service Regulations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1914), 152.

<sup>14</sup> Walter Kretchik, *US Army Doctrine from the American Revolution to the War on Terror* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2011), 132.

martial law; dealing with domestic disturbances; and doing so within the laws of war. The case studies and scenarios it contemplates place the entire responsibility for MG on the commander and his staff's discretion. Its historical case studies are also heavily concerned with the maintenance of good order within the continental United States, in the form of martial law and the suppression of domestic disturbances.

In 1939, the Army began to seriously consider the possibility of another general war on the European continent and published a new *Tentative Field Service Regulations-Operations*. Again, the manual did not address what are now called stability operations, but the Army did begin to consider the importance of local populations on warfighting. A section was devoted to the implications of guerilla warfare in rear areas (the “communications zone” in period terminology), mostly from the perspective of lawful and organized combatants, and framed to prepare U.S. Army officers to lead guerilla operations (perhaps envisioning such a contingency in the Philippines) as well as oppose them.<sup>15</sup> Most of the subject matter instructs the reader on the importance of intelligence, resources such as food and water, and acknowledges the local population as a source of guides rather than auxiliary strength, as future SO manuals would advocate.<sup>16</sup> The 1941 version of Field Manual (FM) 100-5 expanded on this inadequate discussion, changed the name of the section to “partisan warfare,” and for the first time noted the importance of controlling the movement of civilians on the battlefield and the possible need to “quell

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<sup>15</sup> U.S. Army, *Tentative Field Service Regulations-Operations (TFSR-Operations)* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Press, 1939), 228-229.

<sup>16</sup> Though World War II would shortly feature a large number of SO as the modern reader would understand them, it is important to note that in this period, the term was used to refer to mountain warfare, river crossings, night attacks and the like as well as guerilla or partisan warfare.

rebellions of semicivilized peoples.”<sup>17</sup> The mid-war 1943 version changed little about its description of partisan warfare except to remove from its definition explicit references to partisan forces as regular or semi-regular troops.

Around this time, the first purely CA doctrine in Army history was published in the form of FM 41-10, *Military Government and Civil Affairs* (December 1943). The manual advised prospective CA staff officers on basic functions such as protection of cultural monuments and artifacts, lawful use of force in occupied areas, and other administrative duties. Its focus was accurately oriented on the wartime function and was useful to staff CA officers, primarily because much of it was researched and written by students and faculty at the School of Military Government (SMG) at the University of Virginia.<sup>18</sup>

In 1949, some of this language changed to advise leaders to actively enlist the support of “native elements to form small constabulary-type units,” although no mention was made of governing or pacifying liberated or occupied zones.<sup>19</sup> Despite the hampering effect of large numbers of internally displaced persons on the peninsula during the Korean War, the Army made no effort to elaborate on the control of civilians on the battlefield or MG operations in the 1953 edition of FM 100-5.

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<sup>17</sup> U.S. Army, *TFSR-Operations* (1939), 600.

<sup>18</sup> University of Virginia, School of Military Government, Records, 1943-1945, University of Virginia Special Collections, Record Group 6/34/1.131, Box 1, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, VA.

<sup>19</sup> U.S. Army, *Field Service Regulations-Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Press, August 1949), 231.

After the Korean conflict, the Army issued an update of FM 41-10, which remained focused on the responsibilities of a staff officer participating in large-scale MG operation. Its stated primary objectives are to help the CA officer and his parent unit support military objectives, fulfill obligations arising from treaties, support and implement national policy, and provide for the transfer of responsibility from a military commander to a designated civil agency or government.

CA finally appears in Army capstone doctrine in 1962 as an augmentation to Unconventional Warfare (UW) operations, which was itself a response to the Kennedy Administration's call for a military countermeasure to Communist-backed insurgent warfare. The manual introduced two concepts which would have a significant impact on the future employment of CA forces. The first was the spectrum of conflict, with cold war on one end and general war on the other. The center portion, limited war, came to characterize most of the conflict in the Cold War era and significantly affect how employment of CA/MG forces was viewed by military commanders and theorists:

In military operations against irregular forces the civilian support rendered to either our own or allied forces and the irregular forces is often of such importance as to mean the difference between success and failure. Success is dependent upon a definite program of civil affairs and psychological warfare activities to create proper attitudes and relationships with the people in the area both as individuals and as members of the community. The acceptance and understanding of this program by the civilian population are vital to its success. The commander must be provided with the full capability of conducting the civil affairs activities required to accomplish his objective.<sup>20</sup>

UW and its implications receive a chapter in this iteration of FM 100-5, and CA factors prominently in a commander's ability to influence local populations, control and

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<sup>20</sup> U.S., Army, *Field Service Regulations-Operations (FSR-Operations)* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Press, February 1962), 152.

recruit from refugee groups, counter an adversary's attempt at UW operations, and defeat adversary irregular forces. Roles for CA forces also supported a conventional commander with counterintelligence screening and populace and resource control measures.

Additionally, the text coined a term, which would become a touchstone of American involvement in Vietnam—"civic action," defined as any action performed by the military forces utilizing available human and material resources for the well-being and improvement of the community.<sup>21</sup>

The second major concept introduced by the 1962 version of FM 100-5 was situations short of war. Later to be known by several other names including Military Operations Other than War and Low-Intensity Conflict, the term was an admission that the Cold War had artificially suppressed the tendency of conflict to escalate proportionally to the means available. U.S. participation in such situations included new doctrinal roles for U.S. commanders such as encouraging and stabilizing weak governments, deterring and thwarting aggression, and the maintenance and restoration of order to threatened areas.<sup>22</sup>

Expanding on its new approach, the 1968 update to FM 100-5 added support from other government agencies to U.S. commanders such as staff representatives from DoS, the USAID, and the Central Intelligence Agency. Instructions for dealing with U.S. diplomats were also included in Army capstone doctrine for the first time, and acknowledged the chief of diplomatic mission as the head of any given country team with the advice and assistance of the chief of the military assistance advisory group.

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<sup>21</sup> U.S., Army, *FSR-Operations* (1962), 152.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid.

After Vietnam, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command took on a new approach under its first commanding general, William DePuy. Believing that a Soviet direct approach and the potential for high intensity conflict in Germany was the greatest threat, DePuy's new FM 100-5 focused almost exclusively on combined arms maneuver. The words Special Forces and Civil Affairs are conspicuously absent from the text. Subsequent manuals in 1982 and 1986 carried a similar emphasis on high-intensity, conventional conflict in Europe against a peer adversary as part of the AirLand Battle doctrine.

Two key factors influenced the 1993 iteration of FM 100-5, which reintroduced irregular warfare in the form of Operations Other than War. First, the breakup of the Soviet Union eliminated the monolithic threat the United States had faced for over forty years of Cold War. The resulting diffusion of threats and the lack of a true peer threat widened the possible mission set for the Army. It could not be expected to deploy anywhere in the world to meet a diverse range of requirements. Missions making their first appearance in Army doctrine included Noncombatant Evacuation Operations, Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief, and Support to Domestic Civil Authorities (now called Defense Support to Civil Authorities).<sup>23</sup>

The second factor influencing the 1993 update was the 1986 passage of Goldwater-Nichols, which, among other sweeping reforms, required American military forces to fight under a joint model instead of as separate services. Hence, the Army was forced to prepare for missions it had historically not needed to consider; Noncombatant

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<sup>23</sup> Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-0, *Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, June 1993), 13-4.

Evacuation Operations, for example, had always been the purview of the Marine Corps. CA, now officially designated SOF forces, allowed Army and joint commanders flexibility for Operations Other than War by providing a link to local populations and a means of generating local support.

The 2001 FM 3-0, *Operations*, was intended as a transitional document to transform the Cold War Army, a heavy force intended to defeat a numerically superior Soviet peer, into a lighter, more versatile force.<sup>24</sup> FM 3-0 was in some ways an intellectual return to the 1962 FM 100-5, which focused on a more diverse range of missions. For the first time, support and stability operations were linked directly with offensive and defensive operations, and, at least doctrinally, placed on par. The CA regiment, already experiencing a high deployment tempo in the ongoing Balkans conflict, was primed to become a more significant factor in the Army's force employment strategy.

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<sup>24</sup> Kretchik, 248.




Figure 1. Range of Military Operations

Source: Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-0, *Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, June 2001), fig. 1-1.

### Modern Civil Affairs Regiment

The events of 11 September 2001 and the ensuing conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq, and around the world as part of Operation Enduring Freedom fundamentally changed the way CA forces were viewed by supported commanders and policymakers. Early in the war, then-Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld questioned whether CA forces needed to belong to the SO community. Eventually, a compromise divided the CA regiment. A memorandum signed by Army Chief of Staff Peter Schoomaker dictated that all active-duty CA units would administratively fall under U.S. Army Special Operations

Command (USASOC), while all reserve units would fall under U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Command (USACAPOC). Known in the community as “the divorce,” the split was largely responsible for the divergent training requirements and capabilities of the two components’ CA forces.<sup>25</sup>

CME became a USSOCOM program of record in 2008. By this time, support of Operation Enduring Freedom and the Global War On Terror had created a demand for long-term presence in dozens of countries around the developing world, most including a CA team. The CME program was a way to ensure the long-term health of these missions by providing a funding stream. At the core of the concept is the provision of a low-cost, high value option to military and interagency leaders in threatened and failed states. CA teams employed in a CME role are capable of gaining access to areas too dangerous for DoS and USAID representatives to reach, gathering civil information, and accomplishing U.S. embassy and military objectives. Though the program has been active for less than a decade, it has become a cornerstone of the AC CA mission. The 85th CA Brigade, established to support U.S. Forces Command, has begun to employ its teams in a similar fashion, especially in South America under the Civil Affairs Engagement Program. Demands are increasing for RC units to participate in Title XXII engagement missions as well. There is already a growing body of research and literature on the activities and effects of CA teams operating in direct support of interagency objectives, partially because for several years such missions were less driven by doctrine than necessity and informal practice.

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<sup>25</sup> Kathleen Hicks and Christine Wormuth, “The Future of US Army Civil Affairs” (Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC, February 2009), 36.

Official CA doctrine for the program (ATP 3-57.80) arrived in 2013, clarifying how existing concepts such as the CA core tasks and planning methodology fit into CME. Before the official publication of ATP 3-57.80, *Special Warfare* magazine published two articles on Civil Military Support Element (CMSE) missions, in 2011 and 2012. The first, written by then-Major John Wishart, discussed his company's deployment to sub-Saharan Africa.<sup>26</sup> The piece served to introduce the concept of CMSE missions to a general SO audience and explain how effective CAO/CMO could disrupt the influence of violent extremist organizations. The second, by Majors Jeffrey Han and Brion Youtz, explained a company deployment to the U.S. Pacific Command area of responsibility.<sup>27</sup> Their aperture was wider, addressing how the Civil Military Operations Center supports individual teams, how the company approached training for deployment, and framed the mission within the greater scope of the Theater Security Cooperation Plan, to include direct support to U.S. country team objectives. Both articles served a valuable purpose for the nascent CA branch, articulating the short-term value of a CA team in a Title XXII zone to a SOF commander and sparking discussion in the CA community on the subject of best practices for training and preparing a CA company for deployment to multiple countries simultaneously. They did not, however, discuss what specific CAO worked and

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<sup>26</sup> John Wishart, "Out of Africa," *Special Warfare* 24, no. 4 (October-December 2011), accessed 10 March 2016, <http://www.soc.mil/SWCS/SWmag/archive/SW2404/SW2404OutOfAfrica.html>.

<sup>27</sup> Jeffrey Han and Brion Youtz, "Grains of Truth: The Role of Civil-Military Support Elements in Special Operations," *Special Warfare* (July-September 2012), accessed 12 February 2016, <http://www.soc.mil/swcs/swmag/archive/SW2503/SW2503GrainsOfTruth.html>.

why, and neither mentioned the transition of their company's several disparate missions to follow-on teams from the company that relieved them.

CA operates with other U.S. Government (USG) agencies in a way unique among U.S. military forces. Most DoD elements operate in Title X zones, where the DoD is the lead agency and other agencies support a primarily military effort. CA units, especially those employed as a CMSE, normally operate in Title XXII zones, where DoS is the lead agency. This is an important distinction because CMSEs operating in a Title XXII zone are still subject to normal command relationships with their parent units, as well as the GCC who exercises operational control over them. Specific structures differ in missions around the world, but a CMSE in a Title XXII zone is often under the tactical control of a Special Operations Command-Forward (SOC-FWD) or commander. Still others are placed under Chief of Mission authority, meaning a CMSE is directly answerable to the U.S. embassy through the country team. The cumulative effect of operating in a Title XXII zone is normally a CMSE with several masters, who may or may not have convergent goals.

Two scholarly theses have been written in the last two years on the CME program. Major Chris Carr's "Civil Military Engagement Program: A Special Operations Solutions to Threats Derived from Undergoverned Areas," discusses the critical role of CME teams supporting DoS and USAID efforts in semi-permissive and undergoverned areas.<sup>28</sup> He also concludes that CME teams are most effective when they are closely aligned with interagency partners in support of a country team's mission statement, and

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<sup>28</sup> Christopher Carr, "Civil Military Engagements Program: A Special Operations Solution to Threats Derived from Undergoverned Areas" (Master's thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, June 2015).

sometimes experience limited success because of a lack of synchronization with existing DoS objectives. Colonel Brent Bartos’ “The United States Special Operations Command Civil Military Engagement Program-A Model for Military-Interagency Low Cost/Small Footprint Activities,” promotes CME as a cost effective means of maintaining a global SOF presence in possible areas of conflict. He includes case studies on the Viet Cong in Vietnam and CMSE missions in Jordan and Bangladesh.

Major Charles Moores’ monograph for the U.S. Army School of Advanced Military Studies, “Preventing War: Special Operations Engagement in Support of Security Sector Reform,” contains a section on the value of persistent SO engagement in lieu of more traditional episodic engagements. He focuses these recommendations around the idea that SO units “can’t surge trust,” and that relationships cannot be built with host nation military leaders after a crisis occurs.<sup>29</sup> Moores constructs several case studies, including military-to-military engagement by USSOCMPAC forces in the Philippines since the 9/11 attacks, but does not address CME specifically.

Dr. Stephen Burgess’ 2013 essay, “Has the US Military in the Horn of Africa Been a Force that Embraces Strategic Knowledge and Perspective in Countering Violent Extremism and Assisting with Sustainable Development,” takes a long-term view of Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa’s contribution to DoS efforts. He is critical of CA efforts, which make up a majority of Joint Task Force- Horn of Africa’s activities in the human domain. He notes that CA teams did not always understand the operational importance of their projects and programs, and that targeting of their effects was often imprecise. To

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<sup>29</sup> Charles Moores, “Preventing War: Special Operations Engagement in Support of Security Sector Reform” (Monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2014), 19.

date, the CA community has not embarked on any internal analyses of its own contributions to U.S. diplomatic objectives and SO objectives over time in a given country or region.

The RAND Corporation defines ungoverned areas as, “an area in which a state faces significant challenges in establishing control.”<sup>30</sup> Certainly, many hot spots of insurgent activity have become so precisely because there is a governmental vacuum. Yemen is a prime example of this concept. Even before the Arab Spring of 2010, the regime led by President Ali Abdullah Saleh was unable to effectively govern or control any region outside of its capital in Sana'a and its primary economic zone, the ancient port of Aden. Government facilities outside these two zones were chronically under-supported by the central government and depended on the largesse of local tribal leadership. These tribal leaders, particularly in the less-populated eastern part of the country, tended to be more tolerant of extremist groups who preached violent reform. In fact, when Al Qaeda was pushed out of Iraq following the Sunni Awakening, the group reconstituted in Yemen under the Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula brand. The Somalia-based Al Shebaab organization began sending fighters across the Bab al Mandeb into Yemen for training. Thus, Yemen became one of the most welcoming places in the world for jihadist groups.<sup>31</sup> A similar dynamic plays out in a multitude of other undergoverned areas throughout the world.

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<sup>30</sup> Angel Rabasa et al., *Undergoverned Territories: Understanding and Mitigating Terrorism Risks* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2007), iii.

<sup>31</sup> Victoria Clark, *Yemen: Dancing on the Heads of Snakes* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2010), 234.

The violent extremist organization has proved to be an effective and disruptive challenge to both global security and U.S. national security interests. In 2001, the United States was not prepared for a population-centric war. While early conventional engagements in Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003 showcased American dominance in major combat operations, the irregular warfare which followed exposed serious deficiencies in U.S. military capabilities (especially in stability operations) and involved massive, long-term commitments of troops. One of the lasting hallmarks of this unpreparedness was the USG's widespread use of Commander's Emergency Response Program funds, which by 2010 accounted for fully ten percent of the gross domestic product of Afghanistan.<sup>32</sup> Compounding the problem, Commander's Emergency Response Program funds were often spent in shortsighted ways that undermined other U.S. or Afghan government efforts. Other scholars have correctly attributed the lack of soldiers with appropriate cultural training as one of the core causes of the International Security Assistance Force's inability to defeat the Taliban and other insurgent groups in Afghanistan.

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<sup>32</sup> Gregory Johnson, Vijaya Ramachandran, and Julie Walz, "The Commander's Emergency Response Program in Afghanistan and Refining US Military Capabilities in Stability and In-Conflict Development" (U.S. Military Academy, West Point, NY, 2011), 6.

## CHAPTER 3

### HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CIVIL AFFAIRS

#### The Pre-Modern Era of Civil Affairs

There is some disagreement on the exact point at which the Army's history of CA and MG begins, based on its informal origins. Stanley Sandler's *Glad to See Them Come and Sorry to See Them Go: A History of US Army Tactical Civil Affairs, 1775-1991*, argues that the failed American incursion into British Canada was its first use of military power to stabilize and administrate a foreign population.<sup>33</sup> Certainly, the U.S. Army expedition to Canada was an unmitigated military disaster ending with a retreat back to New England; there are noteworthy elements of the military occupation. Though successful in occupying Montreal, the American troops quickly antagonized the local *Quebecois*. Most of the rank and file men of the expedition were contemptuous of the Canadians; the expeditionary chaplain, Ammi Robbins, described Quebec as “the dwelling place of Satan and reign of Antichrist.”<sup>34</sup> The expeditionary commander, Major General Richard Montgomery, was personally a tolerant and reasonable man. He made a positive impression among the locals, ordering his men to respect the religious beliefs of the mostly Catholic Canadians, and protect their property. Unfortunately, he was killed in

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<sup>33</sup> Sandler, 1.

<sup>34</sup> Ammi Robbins, *The Journal of Reverend Ammi Robbins: A Chaplain in the American Army, in the Northern Campaign of 1775* (New Haven, CT: Yale College Press, 1850), accessed 15 March 2016, <http://drs.library.yale.edu/HLTransformer/HLTransServlet?stylesheet=yul.ead2002.xhtml.xsl&pid=mssa:ms.1169&query=&clear-stylesheet-cache=yes&hlon=yes&big=&adv=&filter=&hitPageStart=&sortFields=&view=all>, 7.

an assault on Quebec City shortly thereafter.<sup>35</sup> His replacement, Brigadier General David Wooster, was less tolerant of the local population. Wooster quickly made a critical error in ordering churches closed on Christmas Day. American soldiers frequently looted and stole from local homes. The overarching lack of discipline eventually led to the failure of the entire expedition, but the U.S. Army learned its earliest lessons in MG.

The CA Qualification Course (CAQC) at SWCS teaches its students that the first true MG mission occurred in Mexico City under the leadership of Winfield Scott in the aftermath of the successful Mexican-American War of 1846 to 1848. Scott is credited as the “Father of US Army Civil Affairs” in CA heraldry,<sup>36</sup> largely for the relative peace and stability of the city under his martial law, and his administrative skill. Scott took de facto control of the Mexican government and declared martial law with General Orders No. 20, issued on 19 February 1847. He forbade his troops from criminal misbehavior, protected public and private property from destruction, and threatened severe punishment to soldiers that disobeyed.<sup>37</sup> Scott’s provisional military government was established under the doctrine of military necessity under a combination of customary law and the 1806 Articles of War, by which he felt obligated to safeguard civilians to the best of his

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<sup>35</sup> Michael Gabriel, *Major General Richard Montgomery; The Making of an American Hero* (Cranbury, NJ: Farleigh Dickinson Press, 2002), 97.

<sup>36</sup> U.S. Army Special Operations Command, “U.S. Army Civil Affairs Regiment,” U.S. Army Special Operations Center of Excellence, 14 March 2016, <http://www.soc.mil/SWCS/RegimentalHonors/CivilAffairs.htm>.

<sup>37</sup> Winfield Scott, General Headquarters of the Army, Order Number 20 (Tampico, Mexico: Imprenta de la calle de la Carniceria, February 19, 1847), Rice University, 7 June 2010, accessed 14 March 2016, <https://scholarship.rice.edu/jsp/xml/1911/27562/3/aa00208tr.tei.html>.

ability.<sup>38</sup> The army in Mexico received no guidance on the subject of maintaining order after successful conclusion of the conflict; Secretary of War William Marcy merely cautioned Scott that “It is foreseen that what relates to civil government will be a difficult and unpleasant part of your duty.”<sup>39</sup> Scott, who had practiced law in Virginia, was individually well equipped to handle the administration of the Mexican government until order was restored. A student of history, he had read extensively on the French occupation of Spain during the Peninsular War (1808 to 1814). He saw the risks of repeating the mistakes of French commanders, whose lax discipline towards their own men and harsh control measures against the people led to popular uprising.<sup>40</sup> The issue of General Orders No. 20 answered his concern of American troops inciting revolt among occupied Mexican populations, and simultaneously closed a loophole within the 1806 Articles of War—since the authors had never contemplated an American expeditionary war, they had not written the instrument to extend its jurisdiction beyond the borders of the United States.<sup>41</sup> Other commanders in the Mexican theater subordinate to Scott also met with success in their MG activities after the cessation of combat operations. Major General Zachary Taylor’s occupation of northern Mexico, based in Vera Cruz, was

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<sup>38</sup> U.S. Congress. “U.S. Army Articles of War: An Act for Establishing Rules and Articles for the Government of the Armies of the United States (approved April 10, 1806),” Sons of Union Veterans of the Civil War, accessed 15 March 2016, <http://suvcw.org/education/documents/articles.htm>.

<sup>39</sup> Sandler, 36.

<sup>40</sup> Stephen Carney, *U.S. Army Campaigns of the Mexican War: The Occupation of Mexico, May 1846-July 1848* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 23 May 2006), accessed 15 March 2016, <http://www.history.army.mil/brochures/occupation/occupation.htm#b9>, 26.

<sup>41</sup> Ibid., 28.

effectively intendent of Scott's command. Taylor and Scott did not personally like each other and competed for favor with President James Polk, and they did not share the same philosophy in administration of occupied territory. Many of Taylor's troops were Texan, veterans of the Texas Revolution of 1835 to 1836, and hated the Mexicans; Taylor himself did little to discourage wanton violence against local populations. Ironically, Taylor had drawn up a set of general orders for his men before leaving Mexico, instructing them to treat civilians with courtesy and pay for all requisitioned goods; though he had the order distributed to his troops, he was either unwilling or unable to control his volunteers' behavior. Taylor claimed, "the mounted men from Texas have scarcely made one expedition without unwarrantably killing a Mexican."<sup>42</sup> Another contemporary report estimates over one hundred unprovoked murders of Mexican citizens occurred immediately after the occupation of Matamoros.<sup>43</sup>

The American administration in Mexico also sparked political controversy in Washington. As part of his program of martial law, Scott established military commissions and councils of war to settle criminal matters involving both U.S. and Mexican citizens. Such commissions were the first established outside the continental United States, and issued legal judgments to more than 400 individuals, mostly American soldiers. Scott's practices came under intense legal scrutiny after the war, and the U.S.

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<sup>42</sup> Sandler, 41.

<sup>43</sup> Justin Smith, "American Rule in Mexico," *The American Historical Review* 23, no. 2 (January 1918): 294, accessed 16 March 2016, [http://www.jstor.org/stable/1836568?seq=1#page\\_scan\\_tab\\_contents](http://www.jstor.org/stable/1836568?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents).

Supreme Court denounced his actions in the 1851 decision of *Jecker vs. Montgomery*.<sup>44</sup>

The court ruled, “every court of the United States must derive its jurisdiction and judicial authority from the Constitution and laws of the United States. And neither the President nor any military officer can establish a court in a conquered country and authorize it to decide on the rights of the United States or of individuals . . . nor administer the laws of nations.”<sup>45</sup> Though the Supreme Court softened the blow by acknowledging Scott had acted from military necessity “to assist [in] preserving order in the conquered territory and to protect the inhabitants in their persons and property while it was occupied by the American arms,” clearly the Supreme Court felt Scott had overstepped his bounds. Scott again cited his own military necessity in securing the Mexican state from lawlessness; although he could have cited his lack of political guidance with reference to post-conflict actions to excuse his actions, there is no evidence he did so.

#### The American Civil War, and the Beginning of the Hard War Era

The United States could not have been prepared for the prospect of fighting a war with its own southern states. Certainly the pre-war Army, 16,000 strong and mainly disposed along the western frontier, was not prepared for a large-scale conflict. The Army faced the twin challenges of raising a citizen army to defeat the Confederacy and, eventually, the governance and rule of some nine million citizens of the rebelling thirteen states. To face the latter task, the Army again had to rely on the concept of military necessity and the best judgment of its commanders and staffs. Departmental and field

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<sup>44</sup> U.S. Supreme Court, *Jecker vs. Montgomery*, 54 U.S.498 (1851), Justia, accessed 15 March 2016, <https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/54/498/case.html>.

<sup>45</sup> Ibid.

army commanders had great latitude with which to administrate southern territory under their control, just as they had in the Mexican War. The provost marshal took a leading role in the day-to-day administration of military rule, however:

The linchpin of the Army's administration of civil affairs was the provost marshal. The army established provosts in every district under martial law, and in many areas they represented the only governmental authority. They maintained order and monitored the activities of the disloyal, administering loyalty oaths, collecting fines, arresting rebels, prosecuting criminals, and distributing food to the needy. By and large, the provosts operated fairly, although there were cases of corruption and abuse, especially when they were local men who bore grudges against their secessionist neighbors.<sup>46</sup>

Commanders' approaches to MG varied greatly. The most famous case of its irresponsible practice was the occupation of New Orleans and its environs in 1862 under Major General Benjamin Butler. When Butler took command, he issued a proclamation which immediately incensed the local population: "The United States have sent land and naval forces here to fight and subdue rebellious armies in array against her authority. We find substantially only fugitive masses, runaway property-burners, a whisky-drinking mob, and starving citizens, with their wives and children."<sup>47</sup> Butler became known for his harsh treatment of local civilians, on one occasion ordering a man hanged for tearing down the U.S. flag. However, Butler exceeded even his own standards in May 1862 with his General Orders Number 28, later known as the "Woman's Order." "As the officers and soldiers of the United States have been subject to repeated insults from the women

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<sup>46</sup> Andrew Birtle, *U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine, 1860-1941* (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, U.S. Army, 1998), 26.

<sup>47</sup> Benjamin Butler, General Orders Number 25, *Correspondence* vol. 1, Official Records, series 1, vol. 6, Western Illinois University, accessed 16 April 2016, [http://www.wiu.edu/libraries/govpubs/war\\_ofthe\\_rebellion/series\\_1\\_vol\\_1-29\\_724](http://www.wiu.edu/libraries/govpubs/war_ofthe_rebellion/series_1_vol_1-29_724).

(calling themselves ladies) of New Orleans in return for the most scrupulous non-interference and courtesy on our part, it is ordered that hereafter when any female shall by word, gesture or movement insult or show contempt for any officer or soldier of the United States she shall be regarded and held liable to be treated as a woman of the town plying her avocation.”<sup>48</sup> Butler had singlehandedly inflamed an already tense situation in the city by strongly implying that the ladies of New Orleans were no better than prostitutes. Some presses in both the north and south accused Butler of legalizing rape. In an attempt to ameliorate the worsening situation in the city, Butler was removed from command in late 1862 and reassigned.

#### Native American Relations

The Army’s history with Native American populations is too long and diverse to completely discuss in this thesis, and this research does not intend to give a complete account of Army CA/MG activities in the American west. Rather, this thesis will again focus on the training and education the Army invested in its frontier troops. As with previous military operations in Canada and Mexico, treatment of local populations appears to have followed only the guidance and direction of individual commanders unless driven by negotiated agreements. Even in the case of negotiated treaties such as the 1835 Treaty of New Echota, the Army had considerable latitude in implementing policy guidance. Under the treaty’s controversial terms, the Cherokee Nation agreed to cede most of its territory to the United States. When most of the Cherokee Council (who

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<sup>48</sup> Benjamin Butler, General Orders Number 28, *Correspondence*, vol. 1, Official Records, series 1, vol. 15, accessed 16 April 2016, <http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/cgi/t/text/text-idx?c=moawar;cc=moawar;view=toc;subview=short;idno=waro0006>, 426.

had never approved the treaty) did not move, the treaty became the legal basis for their forcible removal by the Army, led by none other than Winfield Scott.<sup>49</sup> Scott, as he would later in the Mexican War, tried to minimize human suffering to the best of his ability, but a combination of environmental issues and a general lack of training in such operations among U.S. troops led to great loss of life. Of the 18,000 Cherokees designated for removal, an estimated 4,000 died. This is another example of commanding officers knowing what to do and declaring care for civilians as intent, but failing to prevent subordinate commanders and soldiers from abusive and counterproductive acts.

Despite its prime role in taming the west, it appears clear the Army as an institution did not ever seriously weigh civil considerations in its campaign planning. Its soldiers were poorly trained for combat, let alone modern CMO. The lack of staff or individual soldier training in CMO throughout this era was lamentable, but was beyond the capability of an underfunded and undertrained frontier army.

#### The World Wars and Large-Scale Military Government

Though the Army had on occasion conducted military governance of occupied territory, both on the American continent and abroad, the military administration itself was left to commanders like Scott and Taylor and their staffs as an additional burden, without the benefit of formal training or education on the subject. After World War I, the victorious Allied powers set up a military government to oversee post-war Germany. The American MG in the Rhineland, based in Coblenz, was unexpectedly forced to rule a

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<sup>49</sup> U.S. Department of State, “Indian Treaties and the Removal Act of 1830,” Office of the Historian, accessed 17 March 2016, <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1830-1860/indian-treaties>.

defeated German population suffering from near-famine conditions. The American Expeditionary Force (later American Forces Germany), latecomers to the war and inexperienced with foreign military engagement, managed to maintain a high degree of peace and order, especially in contrast to its British and French counterparts. Although the story of American involvement in post-Great War Germany is a successful one, and worthy of inclusion into the overall history of the CA regiment, the American experience in the Rhineland was not without shortcomings. First, the Army's MG could not have succeeded without a content German population, given its unpreparedness for the task. The American Expeditionary Force was doubtless helped by factors outside their immediate control; the Americans had not participated in the war long enough to develop the animus shared between the Germans and the other allied British and French. German officials and American officers generally dealt fairly and honestly with each other, and their mutual respect prevented the violent protests, disobedience, and reprisals of the British and French zones. Because of this trust and relative stability, 90 percent of all governmental functions remained under German control during the American occupation.<sup>50</sup> Areas recovering from the strains of war become more stable if their own social and governmental norms are preserved, and local leaders continue to perform as much of the business of government as possible. The American occupation zone took action against only one German publication printing inflammatory material, while the French zone censored seventy-nine. Such actions provoked a feeling of "hatred for the

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<sup>50</sup> Sandler, 147.

French and fear of the English . . . the people and officials state openly that they are glad the Americans are here instead of the English or the French.”<sup>51</sup>

American officers in charge of German districts, known as *Kreise*, were directed to report extensively on their populations, which drove them to remain involved in local affairs and conscientiously deal with disputes. As a result, Army officers’ involvement in the community frequently gained the genuine respect of the local Germans; one such officer, Captain Channing Page, became so influential he was elected as the local representative to help draft the new German constitution.<sup>52</sup> Although the election result was promptly nullified, the message was clear; a light and benevolent American hand was key to maintaining good order in the Rhineland. The general state of order and calm prevailing in the American sector contrasted sharply with the French and British zones, whose policy of retribution and tacit acceptance of oppressive acts led to overt defiance of the occupying power on numerous occasions. Finally, the selection of men to conduct the business of representing the United States to the German people was a carefully considered act by the commanding general of the occupation force, Major General Henry T. Allen. Officers selected to CA duty from within the occupation force could speak passable German, were typically well mannered and educated, and did not stoop to extortion, profiteering, or other self-serving acts.<sup>53</sup> It appears the Rhineland government

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<sup>51</sup> Sandler, 147.

<sup>52</sup> Thomas Barber, transcript of lecture to the School of Military Government, Charlottesville, VA, 26 February 1943, Records of the School of Military Government, 1943-1945, University of Virginia Special Collections, Record Group 6/34/1.131, Box 2, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, VA.

<sup>53</sup> Barber.

was interested in nothing except keeping the peace and returning home, however. Records from the period do not indicate the occupying power concerned itself overly with metrics or reports, except the very act of demanding them from *Kreise* officers. “No one ever read them; no one had to, because the mere fact that they had to make them kept them all on the hump.”<sup>54</sup> Despite the lack of interest in daily German affairs, the largely common-sense principles allowed the occupation, the United States’ first overseas experience with MG, to succeed.

The Army, fresh off its most successful experience in supporting civil administration and enforcing peace conditions, failed to incorporate the lessons learned through the Rhineland occupation. Although the challenges and successes of the American Expeditionary Force occupation force through 1920 were set out in what came to be known as the *Hunt Report*, the occupation continued for three more years. Despite several historical examples to the contrary, Army theorists still believed MG activities ended with the termination of hostilities. As a result, two other major reports on the Rhineland occupation commissioned by Allen went largely unread and did not contribute to interwar thinking about Army MG activities.<sup>55</sup> The Army institution, with the exception of a handful of articles in professional journals and War College exercises, was uneager to contemplate another long-term, inglorious foray into MG.

One of 1964’s Army World War II history *Green Books*, *Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors*, was a landmark work in the field of CA/MG. It details the activities

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<sup>54</sup> Barber.

<sup>55</sup> Dean Nowowiejski, “The Democrat and the Diplomat: Two American Military Governors of Germany” (Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ, 2008), 102.

of the Army in the liberated territories of Europe, “a mission unprecedented in complexity and size.”<sup>56</sup> As the Army advanced through occupied Europe, it faced the task of restoring order to a devastated population with no remaining governmental apparatus. Some lessons, such as the paramount importance of providing essential services to the population to prevent unrest and the wisdom of returning authority to local leaders as quickly as possible, are fundamental to any CA officer.

After the entry of the United States into World War II, the Army was still reluctant to see logical parallels between the Rhineland government and the planned post-war occupation of Germany. Archival analysis of the records at the University of Virginia, home of the SMG, reveals almost no recognition of the Rhineland after 1919. One lecture was devoted to a first-hand case study of Colonel Irwin Hunt’s experience, delivered by his aide, then-Captain Thomas Barber. Another was a U.S. Army War College study on the Armistice terminating hostilities in World War II, delivered by Lieutenant Colonel Oliver McCleary. Even at a school established and devoted in part to restoring order in Germany, the lessons of the occupation from 1920 to 1923 appeared lost even by 1943.

Instead of relying on relatively recent Army experience, the Civil Affairs Division recruited academics from around the country to lecture, host seminars at their home universities, and, in many cases, put on a uniform and serve as an officer in a specialist role. The SMG curriculum took advantage of the surge in scholarly manpower, using leading academics to instruct officers in the Japanese and German systems of

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<sup>56</sup> Harry Coles and Albert Weinberg, *Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors* (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, U.S. Army, 1964), 3.

government, economic policy, and history. For the first time, the Army was teaching officers to develop a true understanding of the enemy's culture. Professor Arnold Wolfers attempted to frame the problem faced by CA officers bound for assignments in Germany in a lecture entitled "Germany's Position in Europe:"

We must ask ourselves in what spirit we should approach the German problem, so as to be in the best position to rule or administer successfully and intelligently. Should it be a spirit of hatred or a spirit of sympathy? It would seem to me we will want to be as dispassionate and objective as possible . . . Hatred would lead to a distortion of the picture; but if we lean backward in an excess of "fairness," we would fail no less in our task.<sup>57</sup>

Wolfers' approach to the impending problem of MG in Germany was an extension of one of the few lessons learned from the Rhineland—the idea that benevolent MG, firm with the conquered Germans and Japanese but still respecting existing governmental institutions, was the best guarantor of a secure and stable occupation.

In all, the SMG delivered seven graduating classes in 1943 and 1944, contributing several hundred graduates to become military governors or CA staff officers. Ten additional universities in the Civil Affairs Training Program contributed about 2,000 more, although with a shorter training curriculum. The education and training they received represented the best prepared MG apparatus ever assembled. Applicants almost universally possessed qualifications that made them suitable for CA/MG work; the Civil Affairs Division had a wealth of applicant from which to draw. In 1943, 2,000 military officers were selected for training out of 25,000 nominees. By the time "off the street"

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<sup>57</sup> Arnold Wolfers, transcript of a lecture to the School of Military Government, Charlottesville, VA, 15 August 1942, Records of the School of Military Government, Box 2.

civilian recruitment stopped in late 1943, only 960 were selected out of 50,000 applicants.<sup>58</sup>

### Korea

American CA/MG operations were enormous in scale; rule of liberated and occupied populations numbering well over one hundred million fell to the Army on three continents. Military leaders finally understood the need for standing forces who specialized in dealing with civilian populations. The CA regiment, as it was now officially designated in 1949, was still unprepared for the Korean War. Post-war personnel and budget struggles had hit CA especially hard, leaving CA units with low levels of readiness at the outset of war. Henry Kissinger's review of CA in Korea from 1950 to 1951 listed four primary deficiencies:

- a) The need to negotiate CA agreements during the early stages of conflict.
- b) The importance a single focus of responsibility within the Army for all CA functions, and a single point of contact within the Army for relationships with governments in operational areas.
- c) The need for CA officers with language capability.
- d) The need for military commanders and soldiers to know the importance of civil affairs in attaining military and political objectives.<sup>59</sup>

Several of Kissinger's other observations would sound familiar to a contemporary reader. He found that uniformed CA specialists, while useful, were not as valuable as generalists

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<sup>58</sup> Ziemke, 20.

<sup>59</sup> In this context, CA describes the full range of Army activities dealing with local authorities, not just those conducted by CA units. It is more akin to the modern term CMO.

who operated a broad background and common sense.<sup>60</sup> Military CA officers and civilian personnel from both the United States and United Nations also experienced a great deal of interagency friction. Military personnel criticized civilians for their exorbitant salaries, desire to work a forty-hour week in a combat zone, and air of intellectual superiority. Civilians complained in turn about low levels of officer education and a lower status as mere technical advisors. His view in general was that poor interagency communication, exacerbated by an unsuitable command structure, prevented CA from factoring effectively into military decision-making. Among his conclusions were recommendations to impress upon line officers and commanders the importance of CA/MG; greater stress on political subjects at military institutions such as West Point, the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, and the U.S. Army War College; and the development of criteria for explicit selection of CA officers and an integrated training program, within both the active and reserve components.

#### Vietnam, and a Shift to Unconventional Warfare and Interagency Focus

Operating under new Army doctrine (the 1962 FM 100-5), Army CA entered 1965 with a new approach—Civic Action—to use available resources to legitimize and strengthen a host nation government, not perform governmental duties in its place. CA forces deployed to Vietnam in small numbers—three companies in total, beginning in 1962 as Mobile Training Teams and expanding slowly. Most CA forces at this time were in the reserves, but they were never called into Vietnam. This is in response to lessons

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<sup>60</sup> Henry Kissinger C. Darwin Stolzenbach, “Civil Affairs in Korea, 1950-51,” Operations Research Office, Johns Hopkins University, Chevy Chase, MD, 1952, 58.

learned from the Korean War, where reserve CA officers were thought to be overly politically connected.<sup>61</sup> The details of this decision are ultimately irrelevant; reserve CA did not deploy to Vietnam in any numbers.

The three active companies that did serve in Vietnam (the 29th, 41st, and 42nd) were parceled out to three of the four combatant corps areas, beginning in 1965. They did not go as decision makers and staff officers, but as action teams. Their major concern was in assisting the large numbers of internally displaced persons resulting from U.S. combat action.

The training members of the three CA companies received was seriously outdated. One officer, a military intelligence officer detailed to CA remarked, “The CA school focused on the World War II military government examples on one end of the spectrum and on self-help/food/transportation issues on the other end of the spectrum . . . I don’t recall during my year in Vietnam where I said, ‘Oh yeah, I remember that from CA school.’<sup>62</sup> Most officers and men in the CA companies did not even receive CA training.

By all available accounts, the CA companies did an extraordinary job of working with local leaders to improve health standards and quality of life in the villages in which they worked, usually doing so with scarce resources. Ultimately, however, they were to have scattered and insignificant effects on the overall strategic effort. The primary contribution would be made by a military and DoS partnership.

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<sup>61</sup> Stanley, 357. See William Berkman, “Civil Affairs in Vietnam” (thesis, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 28 December 1973), 4.

<sup>62</sup> Troy Sacquety, “Battle Without Bullets: the 41st Civil Affairs Company in Vietnam-Part I, 1965-1967,” *Veritas* 5, no. 3 (2009): 3.

Vietnam was an exceptionally complex conflict; it was neither truly a counterinsurgency nor conventional war, fought against a determined enemy able to shift its tactics based on the situation. Early U.S. military efforts focused on defeating the North Vietnamese army in the field, assessing (probably correctly) that it was the greater threat. The other war against the Viet Cong proved increasingly damaging, however. The Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) program was a nod to the difficulty of massing friendly forces without the ability to pacify large areas and free them of Communist activity, and the necessity of both civilian and military expertise to do so. CORDS was a “bold and innovative attempt to build and operate a truly effective interagency headquarters for pacification even while a more conventional war was being fought by major U.S. and South Vietnamese units.”<sup>63</sup> Though CORDS remained under military control within the Military Advisory Command-Vietnam, it retained civilian leadership in key positions.

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<sup>63</sup> Richard Stewart, “CORDS and the Vietnam Experience: An Interagency Organization for Counterinsurgency and Pacification” (thesis, National War College, Fort McNair, DC, 2006), 8.

CHART 3—STRUCTURE OF U.S. MISSION, SHOWING POSITION OF CORDS: MAY 67




Figure 2. Structure of Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support, May 1967

*Source:* Thomas Scoville, *Reorganizing for Pacification Support* (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, U.S. Army, 1982), 58.

CORDS was not active for very long but was generally effective, largely because it was able to achieve a unity of effort between USAID and military leaders in pacification activities. This thesis will not discuss CORDS at great length except to use it as a marker. With CORDS regarded as a successful failure (it did not, after all, succeed in preserving the existence of the government of South Vietnam), the days of a military-first MG operation in the mold of Germany and Japan after World War II seemed to be at an end.<sup>64</sup> Support of friendly governments would henceforth be interagency matters, usually under DoS leadership with military support.

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<sup>64</sup> Stewart, 103.

## CHAPTER 4

### MODERN CIVIL AFFAIRS

One of the priorities set forth in the *National Security Strategy*, beginning in 2010 and continuing through the 2015 edition, is the prevention and deterrence of future conflict.<sup>65</sup> A primary means to this end is building partner capacity to prevent conflict within states. To build capabilities to help partner nations deny undergoverned areas to violent extremist organizations, USSOCOM established the CME program of record in 2008.<sup>66</sup> The program operates by using CA forces and CMO in a population-centric, indirect approach to combating terrorism and nests within DoD counterterrorism strategy.<sup>67</sup> CMSE, deployed to a specific country or region, are the units of employment for CME missions. CMSEs are usually formed from a four-Soldier Civil Affairs Team.

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<sup>65</sup> U.S. President, *National Security Strategy* (Washington, DC: The White House, February 2015).

<sup>66</sup> U.S. Army Special Operations Command, Directive 525-38, *Civil Military Engagement*, FY15 draft (MacDill Air Force Base, FL: U.S. Special Operations Command, September 2014).

<sup>67</sup> Headquarters, Department of the Army, Army Techniques Publication 3-57.80, *Civil Military Engagement* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, October 2013), 4-1.




Figure 3. Approaches for Combating Terrorism

*Source: Headquarters, Department of the Army, Army Techniques Publication 3-57.80, *Civil Military Engagement* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, October 2013), fig. 4-1.*

One of the reasons CA elements appeal to commanders on the ground is their inherent ability to operate in “Title XXII” zones, where the DoS retains authority for policy and decision-making. CA soldiers are trained to work with DoS and their subordinate agencies to achieve diplomatic and development goals, as well as supported military objectives. SO CA teams in particular possess training which gives them the operational survivability to extend their reach to areas that are simply too dangerous to employ members of the DoS or USAID.




Figure 4. Civil Military Engagement in Phase 0

*Source:* Headquarters, Department of the Army, Army Techniques Publication 3-57.80, *Civil Military Engagement* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, October 2013), fig. 3-15.

CME stands at the intersection of Security Assistance and FID. Individual CMSEs maintain relationships with a mélange of governmental, NGOs, and partner nation organizations in order to give their supported commander situational awareness and accomplish whole-of-government objectives. The program has grown to include persistent missions to seventeen countries globally and several more on an episodic basis. Currently, demand for CA assets worldwide still exceeds supply, especially within the SO CA community. As the drawdown in Afghanistan continues, CME missions project to an even greater proportion of CA deployments worldwide. This will allow CA forces to

take a more prominent role in the SOF Global Network. As Colonel Brent Bartos noted in his 2014 National Defense University thesis, CMSEs are uniquely positioned to provide a cost-effective means of working with Unified Action Partners and meeting national military objectives.<sup>68</sup>

In 2013, Lieutenant General Charles Cleveland, then-Commanding General of USASOC, articulated his vision for the future of SOF activities worldwide. The resulting document, Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) 2022, outlined his desire to change Army SOF to align with national- level strategic guidance such as the NSS and *Quadrennial Defense Review*.

#### Current Civil Affairs Training

CA became an active-duty branch of the Army in 2006. Prior to the branch's full activation, there was only one active-duty CA battalion, the 96th, which exclusively supported SO missions and requirements as a part of USASOC. Officers for the 96th were selected for Functional Area 38, and enlisted CA specialists were Special Forces Soldiers detailed to serve on CA Teams. The officer training program for AC officers was to attend the CAQC for reservists, at that time a two-week program. NCOs received no additional formal training in moving from an SF position to CA. With the opening of the branch, SWCS designed a new and longer Program of Instruction), implemented in 2008. CA officers would be accessed at the grade of first lieutenant (promotable) and NCOs at the grade of specialist (promotable). They would attend a forty-three-week

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<sup>68</sup> Colonel Brent M. Bartos, U.S. Army, “The United States Special Operations Command Civil Military Engagement Program-A Model for Military-Interagency Low Cost/Small Footprint Activities” (Master’s thesis, Joint Forces Staff College, Norfolk, VA, April 2014).

course consisting of Special Operations Language Training, regional studies training, an enhanced, eight-week, three-day CAQC, and a three-week culmination exercise designed to parallel the complex environments and challenging interpersonal dilemmas of Robin Sage (the culmination exercise at the end of the Special Forces Qualification Course). With only minor modifications, this forty-three-week program is still the mechanism by which selected officers and NCOs receive CA training.

Reserve CA make up approximately 95 percent of the Army's inventory. Despite an identical branch designation, reserve CA officers train to different standards than their active-duty counterparts. Special Operations Language Training and regional training are not included. Officers attending CA training at the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy SWCS integrate with active-duty students near the end of the forty-three-week CA pathway, during the CAQC. The course consists of twenty-nine consecutive days of training in order to keep all training in temporary duty status. Budget constraints limit the number of CA reservists that can attend training, with the result that CA units maintain a low level of military occupational specialty (MOS) qualification.

CA Assessment and Selection began operating in 2010 to select active-duty Soldiers for training and assignment in the branch. Designed to test the candidate's interpersonal skills, intellect, and stamina, the ten-day CA Assessment and Selection regimen replaced the so-called paper board used to screen applicants for CA branch transfer assignments from the active Army inventory. Students are placed under physical and mental stress to identify suitability for the demands of SO missions. More complete analysis of CA assessment, selection, and training trends appears in chapter 6.

In MG, U.S. military officers may rule by fiat and edict if they must, as they have legal authority over an occupied zone. As a result many of the lessons of the past do not apply directly to modern CME activities. A CMSE, operating in a Title XXII zones, has neither the authority nor the ability to rule or govern, and must accomplish its mission by befriending and influencing key leaders. As a result, the SO CA community must evaluate the effectiveness of its mission sets through the lens of its more recent engagement activities around the world. Though a modern CA soldier would recognize many of the principles of MG, such as knowledge and respect for the host nation's culture, the mechanisms and authorities to accomplish the mission have changed considerably.

Transition, the final step in the CA methodology, becomes especially important in CME missions because most programs cannot be planned, approved, funded, executed, and completed without at least one turnover in personnel. The short-term nature of military deployments in proportion to DoS postings causes a high turnover rate among military personnel, making continuity of effort a critical principle. While this problem is familiar to any CA soldier experienced with CME, it remains an understudied aspect of the program.

#### An Interagency Perspective on Civil Military Engagement

DoS and USAID representatives, interviewed for the purposes of this thesis from the Latin America and Asian regional bureaus, are generally pleased with the quality of the SO CA personnel they have worked with in the past. There are, however, areas where some improvement is needed. CMSE elements in Guatemala have proven over several years of engagement to be adept at developing relationships with local leaders- leading

one career diplomat to remark that they were “amazed at how generative those conversations [with local leaders] are.”<sup>69</sup> At times, however, they appear to give DoS and USAID officers the impression they act as members of the intelligence community.

“There can be a lack of trust sometimes with USAID officers, who can see CA as an intelligence collection activity. They wonder why the military is in a country with no war, in civilian clothes, handing out business cards with a gmail.com address . . . we get in a lot of trouble for using personal emails.”<sup>70</sup> A CMSE’s interest in small villages as they relate to known Zones of Facilitation is legitimate, as the non-state actors in such zones frequently undermine the legitimacy and stability of the host nation’s government. CMSE projects prioritized toward them therefore support USAID and DoD objectives, and the CMSE is not acting as an active intelligence collector. The problem does not originate with the activity itself, but with the presentation. CA soldiers must be forthcoming to interagency personnel about their mission and objectives, and clearly highlight the whole-of-government approach of their projects. It is unlikely that defense and development objectives will align perfectly, but CA teams must seize upon the opportunities presented when they do.

Another barrier to interagency cooperation for CMSE teams is in preparation. There is often a stark contrast in education and foreign experience between CMSE and USAID/DoS personnel. Members of the USAID Office of Civil-Military Cooperation have reported similar deficiencies; that CMSE members are individually capable of

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<sup>69</sup> USAID Deputy Director, Guatemala, interview by author, Washington, DC, 21 January 2016.

<sup>70</sup> Ibid.

building and maintaining relationships, but are not always clear as a team when asked why they are in country. One career diplomat with USAID recounted an incident during an in-brief with a CA team. When he asked the team their mission, he received simultaneous answers from two team members that they were there to support TSOC objectives, and to provide humanitarian aid to underserved local populations.<sup>71</sup>

Transparency is a valuable asset for a SO CA team seeking to develop access to denied areas. This research suggests that interagency partners such as USAID are more likely to develop trust with a CMSE if the team is clear and forthcoming about its role supporting SO objectives, but that CA Soldiers are not members of the intelligence community.

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<sup>71</sup> USAID Civil-Military Cooperation Bureau member, interview by author, Washington, DC, 20 January 2016.

## CHAPTER 5

### RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The purpose of this research is to assess CA training, doctrine, and organization throughout the history of the Army, and analyze their effects on the development modern force. Additionally, this thesis will analyze modern methods of assessing, training, and employing CA forces, and whether these methods are optimal for present mission requirements.

Additional information about CA training was derived from existing histories in the form of published studies, books, and professional articles. The researcher has had the opportunity to conduct archival review of 1942 to 1945 CA training records from the SMG at the University of Virginia. These records are examined in detail, as are those of SWCS from 1985 to 2000, the last year for which archival records are available.

A further point of emphasis is the suitability of present-day CA training to prepare Soldiers to work alongside interagency partners such as the USAID and its subordinate offices, as well as the observations of its members who have experience working with deployed CA teams. A semi-structured interview will be used, based on purposive sampling of subject matter experts in both military and civilian roles to discuss the effectiveness of CA training in present-day CME missions in two different COCOMs and Regional Bureaus (see Appendix C). These interviews are augmented where possible by operational guidance documents such as the Ambassador's Strategic Mission Plan and other sources. ‘

This thesis assesses the results of these missions over time in gaining access to denied or semi-permissive areas, the extent to which CA teams were prepared by their

training to identify and mitigate drivers of instability in these areas, and the benefits of those activities to the country team's mission as a whole. Each individual interviewed signed an informed consent form (Appendix A) and was briefed on their rights as a research subject in accordance with guidance from the U.S. Army Command and General Staff Officer's Course's Quality Assurance Office.

The researcher, as well as the Quality Assurance Office, will also secure all informed consent forms for a period of three years in accordance with DoD Instruction 3216.02, Subject: Protection of Human Subjects and Adherence to Ethical Standards in DoD-Supported Research. Interview responses informed analysis on the primary research question as well as all secondary research questions. Appendices B and C are examples of the questions asked of respondents, and Appendices D and E contain the interview responses themselves.

The research employs a purposive sampling method to identify interviewees. Interviews align members of DoS and USAID that have experience working with CME teams as well as from the AC 85th CA Brigade and units from the RC. When possible, the interviewees from Dos and DoD have worked in the same areas and may be familiar with the same specific mission. The interviews will use a structured format consisting of different, but related batteries of questions to assess the preparedness and effectiveness of CA engagement in deployed environments from different perspectives. For example, interviews with a USAID deputy director in Guatemala correspond in context to those of a CME team leader in same area. Although there may be agreement on facts such as humanitarian aid programming and mission activities in such areas, perception of CME effectiveness can vary based on USG affiliation.

Interviews will be conducted with the USAID Civil-Military Cooperation Bureau, to include the deputy director. These interviews examined the overall perception of USAID toward the CA regiment, and individual tactical teams' preparedness for the challenges unique to a Title XXII environment. The deputy director was selected because of the office's high exposure to CME teams preparing for duty across all COCOMs; CME teams usually in-brief at the Bureau as a part of pre-mission training, meaning the Bureau sees at least a quorum of teams as they prepare to deploy.

Interview questions are designed to capture the interviewee's impressions of the effect of modern CA training to prepare a Soldier for the rigors of the diverse CA mission set, which includes both combat zones and a variety of Title XXII environments. While the interviews are structured to allow for the interviewee to share their own experiences, the questions provide a framework to preserve consistency in the formatting of responses. The researcher will only ask questions as listed in the appendices, and will only deviate to get clarification of a response. For example, every interviewee, regardless of USG agency affiliation, is asked whether they feel CA teams receive the necessary guidance from higher headquarters to thoroughly understand and complete their mission. An anecdotal response would be acceptable but must clearly state an answer, and a reason for the answer provided. Questions and their responses will be grouped in their respective appendices based on the primary or secondary research question to which they pertain.

This research will show that the Army's view of CA/MG has evolved over time and the role of the CA Regiment has changed greatly. One constant, however, is that CA work is fundamentally and irrevocably human. Some aspects of CA work can be accounted for, but largely defy quantitative measurement in the field because they are

based on human interaction. For this reason, the researcher elected to use primarily qualitative research. Discussion and analysis of the CORDS program in Vietnam will investigate some of the benefits and drawbacks of quantitative analysis, but will not itself generate new data. This research will, however, employ quantitative methods when analyzing the current training pathway for SO CA Soldiers. This element of the research is intended to help provide more detail on what sort of Soldier joins the CA community, and what education and experience they bring with them. The 3rd Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group created records for each student passing through the CAQC since 2006, using the Student Management System data portal. Over 1,800 student data points are included in the analysis, dating back to the establishment of CA as an active-duty branch in 2006 and the accompanying expansion of the training facilities. Data analyzed will include relevant fields of a military nature such as educational background, prior MO code, foreign language proficiency ratings, etc. In accordance with the Privacy Act of 1974, no Personally Identifiable Information was collected for the purposes of this research.

After compiling information from the interview responses as well as historical scholarly publications, the researcher analyzed and answered the primary and secondary research questions. After analysis of the research findings in chapter 6, the researcher will present final findings and recommendations in chapter 7.

## CHAPTER 6

### ANALYSIS

This chapter will analyze the qualitative research conducted in chapter 2, as outlined in the research methodology. Next, the chapter will analyze and interpret historical trends in CA and MG, how these trends were supported by prevailing Army concepts and doctrine, and whether they were effective. In addition to answering the primary research question, the analysis will emphasize elements that are common to secondary research questions.

The purpose of this research was to explore the historical and doctrinal underpinnings of the CA regiment. The researcher traced its evolution from an ad hoc requirement of commanders to act as military governors, to the development of specialists to serve as the link between military commanders and local populations, to its present means of employment as an augmentation to both military commanders and U.S. country teams working by, with, and through host nation security partners.

The primary research question was; how has the Army, and later the CA regiment, been historically prepared to carry out its responsibilities in MG and CA activities to support the overall mission? While there is no short answer, it appears that the Army has not prepared itself well for CA and MG responsibilities. Successful episodes such as the Mexican War and the Rhineland were not the result of effective administrative systems and doctrine; agile and adaptive commanders proved capable of handling stability operations which were unexpected of them. The successes of World War II were attributable to the mobilization of large numbers of academics and professionals to serve as CA officers and advisors more than a triumph of existing CA

doctrine or the Army's foresight. Doctrine, for that matter, did not formally exist before 1940 on the subject of CA/MG.

The Korean War found the Army unprepared for the scope of its responsibilities. Though Army CA can claim success in managing the flow of civilians from the battlefield, it failed utterly in working with the Korean government. The U.S. Army Government in Korea, a bloated headquarters with more than fifty general officers, was unable to effectively coordinate aid during the war. CA suffered a poor reputation and the U.S. Army Government in Korea was seen as both a "general's graveyard," and "a dumping ground for incompetents;" many CA officers in Korea had no formal training in the discipline.<sup>72</sup> Worse, CA officers did not forge productive working relationships with either UN or U.S. civilian development specialists.

CA also failed to make a meaningful difference in the Vietnam. Less than 1 percent of CA forces (now almost exclusively in the reserves, as Kissinger had recommended) were ever deployed to Vietnam. Only three understrength companies (the 29th, 41st, and 42nd) saw any action. DoS and USAID took on a much more prominent role and generally did not seek the help of uniformed CA personnel. CORDS was executed with virtually no participation by CA officers.

The changes in the CA community springing from the passage of Goldwater-Nichols should have resulted in a much more robust capability for influencing local populations and working with non-military organizations such as USAID and various NGOs. Its presence in SOF should have presaged a shift from MG structures and responsibilities to more effectively support UW and FID roles. Instead, CA training and

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<sup>72</sup> Stanley, 314.

readiness within USACAPOC remained as low as it was during the Korean War.

Training courses became steadily shorter as well. At present, only a fraction of CA officers assigned to reserve units have attended the twenty-nine-day course to qualify for the MOS.

This research suggests that effective CA operations have always been key to post-conflict stability, but the Army has consistently undervalued (or completely unconsidered) them in the peacetime military. Until fairly recently, civil considerations were not a significant part of Army operational concepts, institutional learning, or doctrine. Finally, the Army has never adequately integrated professional expertise from interagency partners and has rarely recruited such expertise from civilian academia. The answer to the primary research question is that the Army has consistently found itself unprepared to meet challenges in governing and administering occupied territory, and securing conditions for conflict termination.

The first secondary research question of this thesis was; how has CA doctrine developed over time to meet anticipated challenges in administration of occupied zones, influencing local populations, and mitigating drivers of instability in host nations? As discussed in the introductory chapter, a review of relevant history and doctrine suggests that the Army approach to CA evolved in five general movements:

1. A pre-modern era, where control of an occupied civilian population was the purview of the commanding general, and his personal view of chivalry or military necessity. Coordination with other government agencies such as the DoS or the War Department was usually minimal. This state of affairs persisted until the Lieber Code placed uniform federal restrictions on northern

commanders in the midst of the American Civil War and protected occupied populations under the Rule of Law.

2. A hard war era, influenced by the American experience in the Civil War. The increasing violence of the conflict drove harsher methods of population control and governance during the latter half of the war, such as during Sherman's March to the Sea. The post-war Reconstruction period was a lengthy and bitter experience in martial law in many areas of the southern states. Later American involvement in the Philippines from 1898-1902 was characterized by harsh control of so-called uncivilized local populations as well.
3. A brief period of large-scale Military Governance and reconstruction following total warfare. This period began with the unexpected American occupation of the Rhineland following World War I. After ignoring the lessons of the occupation, large-scale MG resumed with post-war governance of liberated Europe and South Asia and occupied Germany and Japan, stretching into the early 1950s. American presence during this time was characterized by a comprehensive interagency effort, generally led by the military.
4. A shift in focus to tactical-level CA teams supporting a host-nation government, heralded in large part by major changes to the 1962 version of FM 100-5, *Operations*. Beginning with U.S. involvement in Vietnam, CA units doctrinally conducted operations to stabilize or pacify rear areas, often in support of unconventional operations. When MG was employed, usually at

village level under the auspices of the CORDS program, the leading official was usually a civilian member of the DoS.

5. The passage of Goldwater-Nichols in 1986 included the CA Regiment in SOF, and spurred sweeping changes in training, doctrine, and organization. Soon after the overall mission approach of Army CA changed from support of host nation governments to support of assigned U.S. military commanders. Stability operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, which before may have been MG functions, were now used in support of a sovereign host nation government, with only short periods of unilateral authority. The Global War on Terror, and the resultant growth of the AC CA force, led to an expansion of SO CA teams operating in Title XXII zones in persistent engagement missions, later known as CME, and a focus on the prevention and deterrence of future conflict by working with partner nations. Such engagement is compatible with the current AOC and figures to continue into the future.

The next secondary research question is most relevant to the CA SOF community; how have methods of CA training evolved to meet operational requirements, and how can it change its training methods to enhance performance in the field, especially in Title XXII engagement. The 2006 creation of an active-duty CA branch expanded SOF CA strength from a single battalion to a brigade (the 95th). The change also allowed for more strenuous selection, assessment, and training practices.

As Kissinger noted in his study of civil-military activities in Korea, it is imperative that CA practitioners have both a broad base of knowledge in development as well as a firm grasp of strategic and operational goals. Until very recently, CA has been

an unwanted supplementary obligation of military commanders, or the unlucky draft of individuals or units into such work. Without trained and dedicated professionals, aware of the operational as well as humanitarian implications of their actions, CA work can quickly become “a game of battleship; random strikes across a blank board with minimal hope of success.”<sup>73</sup> For this reason, CA Soldiers must undergo lengthy and challenging training. The regiment must continue to select individuals with the intellect and character required to deal effectively with career diplomats and career fishermen alike.

The current model for the selection, accession, and training of CA officers and NCOs is probably sustainable, but will probably exacerbate the divide between the active and reserve CA communities and damage the mission effectiveness of the branch. The 38A (Civil Affairs Officer) MOS training pathway, for example, invests 55.6 weeks in its active-duty officers, including a two-week competitive assessment and selection process at the SWCS. Reserve officers, who are not assessed and selected through the same means, receive twenty-nine days of training and an additional seventy-five hours of distance learning.

The significant disparity between training standards for active and reserve CA Soldiers is largely a fiscal issue. USACAPOC does not have the available training funds to match the active-duty standard, which has been in place since 2008 as a permanent change of station move. As a result, training time for CA reservists is limited to temporary duty status, which obligates the CAQC to train officers to two standards to award the same MOS code. Despite this cost-saving measure, USACAPOC maintains a low level of readiness with regards to MOS qualification; just 312 of its 1,118 authorized

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<sup>73</sup> Carr, 60.

38A positions hold the MOS. The remainder hold a different MOS while training as a member of a CA battalion and receive on the job training. All of this renders USACAPOC much less capable of supporting CA engagement in Title XXII zones and working effectively with members of the U.S. diplomatic community and NGOs.

The trend of low rates of readiness in reserve CA is not new. Kissinger noted that few CA officers in Korea had training or experience in the field. Before a 1958 intervention in Lebanon, U.S. European Command did not have a single qualified CA officer to put against the mission.<sup>74</sup> SWCS records from the early 1990s indicate low rates of MOS qualification were still a problem; an official request from USACAPOC caused SWCS to temporarily surge training capacity as part of a so-called get well program. During this time, SWCS was also steadily shortening the CAQC in order for the underfunded CA community to afford more student throughput. By 1991, the course had been reduced to two weeks, with a one-week version available for deployment mobilization.<sup>75</sup>

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<sup>74</sup> Sandler, 337.

<sup>75</sup> David J. Baratto, “Program of Instruction for Civil Affairs Qualification Course,” U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, Fort Bragg, NC, 1991, Records of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command Historian, Collection 2007.14, Box 1, U.S. Army Special Operations Command Archives, Fort Bragg, NC.




Figure 5. Comparison of Active-duty and Reserve Component Civil Affairs Officer Training Pathway by Subject and Student Contact Hours, 2016

*Source:* Bravo Company, 3rd Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group, “Comparison of Active-duty and Reserve Component Civil Affairs Officer Training Pathway by Subject and Student Contact Hours” (U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, Fort Bragg, NC, 2016).

Perhaps more telling, the training gap between active and reserve CA officers that share the same MOS is actually widening. The addition of a twelve-week Army SOF Captain’s Career Course to the CA pathway in 2013 brought the duration of active-duty training to 55.6 weeks. CA reservists receive a twenty-nine-day course, supplemented by distance learning. The training gap may widen further in the near future as well. While

reserve training remains artificially limited by financial constraints, the SOF units that the active-duty pathway feeds are requesting additional capability from graduates. In February 2016, Colonel Scot Storey, commander of the 95th CA Brigade, requested more advanced tactical skills from CAQC graduates.<sup>76</sup> While basic rifle marksmanship is a foundation of Soldier training throughout the Army, SOF CA teams require advanced skills to integrate effectively with Special Forces units. SWCS is currently considering lengthening the CA pathway further to include more tactical training and advanced marksmanship.

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<sup>76</sup> Commander, 95th Civil Affairs Brigade, Memorandum to Commandant, Civil Affairs Regiment, 95th CA Brigade, U.S. Army Special Operations Command, 18 February 2016.




Figure 6. Comparison of Active-duty and Reserve Component Civil Affairs Officer Training Pathway by Training Weeks, 2016

*Source:* Bravo Company, 3rd Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group, “Comparison of Active-duty and Reserve Component Civil Affairs Officer Training Pathway by Training Weeks” (U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, Fort Bragg, NC, 2016).

SWCS has begun to expand its capabilities to train advanced CA capabilities as well. The Special Warfare Advanced Analytics and Targeting Course will train CA operational planners to more accurately identify root causes of conflict and instability, integrate CAO into the joint targeting cycle, and better understand regulations that govern the intelligence community.<sup>77</sup> Available to all SOF MOS codes, the Special Warfare

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<sup>77</sup> U.S. Army Special Operations Command, U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, Academic Handbook, 2016, U.S. Army Special Operations Command Archives, Fort Bragg, NC, 41.

Advanced Analytics and Targeting Course and future CA advanced skills courses will further widen the training gap between active and reserve CA.

The final secondary research question was; how has the relationship between CA and interagency partners such as the DoS and USAID evolved and changed over time, and what lessons from this history can be applied to modern CA activities? Army CA has not traditionally enjoyed a strong relationship with interagency partners. As discussed in chapter 2, early interactions between CA officers and civilians from the United States and United Nations in Korea were contentious and resentful, and generally did not improve in Vietnam. The CA community began making a concerted effort to integrate with U.S. country teams with the CME program, which officially began in 2008 but had been in informal practice for several years prior. Enhanced training budgets allowed for active-duty teams to attend interagency weeks as a part of pre-mission training. The USAID Bureau of Civil-Military Cooperation, with active and former CA officers on staff, connects deploying CA teams with agency representatives in the field to help build working relationships.

As the primary SOF CA mission shifted toward CME in Title XXII zones, the CAQC added course material to initiate students to U.S. embassy and country team operations. Students are now required to read strategic guidance documents such as the *National Security Strategy* and Theater Security Cooperation Plans, and are taught to be familiar with U.S. country team plans. This practice produces students who are better able to work within a U.S. embassy. Further, CA teams well versed in country team priorities will select their operations more carefully as part of an interagency team. Doing so helps to address a common failing of CA teams going back as far as Korea, with

individual officers and teams seeking only to help a local population, and producing sporadic or even counterproductive effects.

## CHAPTER 7

### CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Americans are very competent at fighting, but they are much less successful at fighting in such a way that they secure the strategic and, hence, political rewards they seek. The United States continues to have difficulty regarding war and politics as a unity, with war needing to be permeated by political considerations.

— Colin Gray, “Irregular Enemies and the Essence of Strategy; Can The American Way of War Adapt?”

This research set out to analyze how the Army (and later its CA branch) has been prepared for its obligations in stabilizing occupied regions, and treating with local populations. The researcher used a combination of established literature, primary sources and records, and interviews with military and interagency professionals to gather information.

In chapter 4, research analysis suggested that Army CA has undergone significant transformation in its history. Preparing for a full-scale MG, as in historical examples like Germany, Japan, and Korea, is not in line with current national security or the Army AOC. In any event, such occupations made heavy use of civilian aid agencies and military officers pulled directly from academia; career military officers do not have a strong track record as MG specialists. Individual commanders have found success as military governors; the institution has not. Instead of assuming unilateral control of a government, U.S. policy for the past fifty years has been to work with and through host nations. Engagement in the form of Security Forces Assistance, FID, and Nation Assistance are the most valuable uses for Army CA in the twenty-first century.

The active component of the CA branch is prepared for such engagement. However, a growing capability gap exists between the active and reserve components. As discussed earlier in this research, there is a serious issue with active 38A captains receiving more than fifty-five weeks of training, compared to less than nine for a reserve captain in the same MOS. A lack of effective training will hinder reserve CA from answering present and future mission requirements effectively. Worse, the disparity will continue to make interoperability difficult between CA personnel in different components.

The American way of war prefers a quick victory. It is impatient and profoundly regular. Perhaps above all, it is apolitical; Americans tend to think in binary terms of war and peace.<sup>78</sup> Westphalian states are in a constant state of conflict, armed or otherwise. The Army has not traditionally understood this. Instead, its behavior in the twenty-first century has been more generally consistent with the Prussian way of war—excellent firepower, discipline, maneuver, and logistics (particularly at the tactical level), but strategically deficient. If the Army is to succeed in meeting the AOC's goal of preventing conflict as well as winning wars and setting favorable conditions for peace, it must understand two important points. First, an expeditionary army of decisive action must have standing CA forces specialized in stability operations, and conventional forces who are capable of shifting from major combat to stability operations. Second, those CA

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<sup>78</sup> Colin Gray, “Irregular Enemies and the Essence of Strategy; Can The American Way of War Adapt?” (Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA, 2006), accessed 16 April 2016, <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub650.pdf>, 30.

forces must be carefully selected, intensively trained, and ready before the need arises for them.

Civil Affairs and Military Government are terms that have carried many definitions throughout the Army's history. Neither, in their original definitions, are applicable to today's CA role. The current mission set, aligned with the *National Security Strategy*, is the result of a long evolution in civil-military engagement wherein the USG no longer seeks to take a leading role in the development of a foreign power, but act by, with and through security partners while respecting their sovereignty. The focus of CA teams must change as well. Skill in functional areas is less valuable in an engagement role than is a firm grasp of strategic goals and how tactical actions can affect them. The ability to operate in semi-permissive environments and open them to DoS and USAID experts for further aid is the new currency of the realm.

The Army is poised to make its first-ever peacetime investment in a highly trained and deployable CA capability. For most of American history, the Army has willfully ignored the need to stabilize occupied areas until the problem was upon it. Culturally sensitive, linguistically capable, and survivable CA teams are a valuable asset for U.S. SOF units and for country teams in failed or failing states.

The investment appears to have been worthwhile. Since the 2006 creation of a full active-duty branch, USASOC has built a foundation of highly motivated and intelligent CA Soldiers, capable of working in a variety of roles. The assessment and selection program appears to have had a positive effect as well. In 2015, selection rates were as low as 52 percent. Candidates with poor fitness, oral and written communication skills, or issues working in small teams are screened out during selection. The average General

Technical score of a candidate selected from active-duty to attend CA training is 117.<sup>79</sup>

They are trained to conduct all CA core tasks in high-intensity combat, counterinsurgency, in CME missions through U.S. country teams, and other missions.

The importance of developing such versatile Soldiers cannot be overstated, given the history of Army CA forces and the current AOC. The demands of the ARSOF community, combined with increasing engagement by the general-purpose force in roles such as Operation United Assistance mean that CA forces can be asked to help solve a wide range of problems for the nation. The incoming commander of the 95th CA Brigade shared his philosophy on the subject in a recent talk given to students at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. “We put a lot of effort into making sure that commanders ‘use’ us correctly. What we need to do is make sure we are well positioned to solve problems for the Army, and success will follow.”<sup>80</sup>

The AOC’s vision for future force employment may soon include a seventh warfighting function, engagement. The addition of a new warfighting function reflects the importance of shaping operations to prevent and deter conflict, and the idea that potential security challenges to the U.S. involve security, governance, economic development, essential services, and a host of other tasks not in the traditional military

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<sup>79</sup> Bravo Company, 3rd Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group, B/3/1st Records (Student Data, U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, Fort Bragg, NC, 15 February 2016).

<sup>80</sup> Jason Slider, lecture to U.S. Army Command and General Staff College SOF students, 8 January 2016, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

purview. The Army will need proficiency in these areas to operate more efficiently in the land domain.<sup>81</sup>




Figure 7. Seventh Warfighting Function

*Source:* U.S. Army Special Operations Command. “ARSOF 2022.” U.S. Special Operations Command, 2013. accessed 22 September 2015, [http://www.soc.mil/Assorted%20Pages/ARSOF2022\\_vFINAL.pdf](http://www.soc.mil/Assorted%20Pages/ARSOF2022_vFINAL.pdf), 11.

The Army’s renewed emphasis on engagement activities is not reflected in its force structure decisions. The Army has two brigades in the active force; the 95th, assigned to USASOC, and the 85th, assigned to support U.S. Army Forces Command. The 85th will be deactivated, depriving the Army of an effective and inexpensive means of engaging local stakeholders and extending the reach of U.S. country teams.

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<sup>81</sup> Headquarters, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command. Training and Doctrine Command Pamphlet 525-8-5, *U.S. Army Functional Concept for Engagement* (Fort Eustis, VA: U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 24 February 2014), 2.

The joint force's most likely operating environment is a failed or failing state, to conduct stabilization missions that involve a range of activities such as intervention in conflict, relief of human suffering, and counterterrorism.<sup>82</sup> Further, future joint campaigns will "facilitate the combination of military and non-military activities with greater agility to achieve strategic outcomes in conditions of armed conflict, competition below armed conflict, and cooperation between partners and allies."<sup>83</sup> The Army has no force better suited to the joint force's stated aims than active-duty CA units do.

In deactivating almost half of its active CA force structure, the Army perpetuates a cycle demonstrated through this research; of ignoring local populations in war, creating CA capabilities after the need is identified, and quickly deconstructing them. If the force is truly serious about extending the Army's reach in remote areas, the Army has to rethink this decision.

### Recommendations

The CA branch can take several actions to address the capability gap between components, and posture itself more effectively for engagement. Currently, only active CA Soldiers, concentrated in the 95th and 85th CA Brigades, are trained conducting engagement missions well. First, the Army should retain the current SOF CA training pathway for generalists, and establish a new CA designation for functional specialists. It is not reasonable to expect that the interagency and joint force will always be able to differentiate between active and reserve CA training standards—a 38A is a 38A where a

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<sup>82</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Joint Concept for Integrated Campaign Planning (Draft)" (Washington, DC, 16 April 2016), 8.

<sup>83</sup> Ibid.

supported unit is concerned. Reserve CA Soldiers who receive the shorter training courses should be coded into a new and different MOS, with identifiers to denote functional specialty. Ideally, USACAPOC should be provided the funds to ensure its Soldiers receive full-length training at SWCS—this has been practice in the National Guard component of the SF Regiment for some time. Barring the available funds to do this, a new MOS to mark the difference in training is necessary.

Second, SWCS should continue investment in the Institute for Military Support to Governance (IMSG). This research has provided evidence, especially from Korea, that a reserve-based CA capability, filled with large numbers of poorly-trained functional specialists in name only, is not effective. The most meaningful development work, beginning from World War II, has been done by civilians from organizations other than the military, or by civilians brought into military services for their skills. If husbanded correctly, IMSG has a chance to recreate the latter by recruiting high-end civilian talent to take an Army commission via their Military Government Specialist program.<sup>84</sup>

Third, all Army CA Soldiers need additional opportunities to interact with interagency partners, most especially USAID. The competitive advantage of CA teams working in Title XXII zones is understanding country team priorities, how CA activities fit into them, and gaining access to semi-permissive or denied areas using that knowledge. CA Soldiers, especially junior officers in leadership and planner roles, must learn to work closely with partners like USAID from the beginning of their training at SWCS. Many CA units have adopted the practice of pushing junior leaders in the Joint

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<sup>84</sup> Bill Mandrick, “Military Government Specialist Information and Recruiting Brief” (PowerPoint briefing, US Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, Fort Bragg, NC, 6 January 2016).

Humanitarian Operations Course. This is a good start. SWCS should investigate the possibility of a formal partnership with the Foreign Service Institute to create a closer relationship between the two organizations.

SOF CA elements, particularly those conducting missions under the auspices of the CME program have a unique position within the DoD. No other element is as capable of furthering defense, diplomatic, and development objectives at the tactical and operational level as the CMSE. Accompanying this unique and valuable role is the requirement to develop individuals and small teams capable of interacting with a wide range of people and organizations, and building networks of influence to accomplish their mission.

As Kissinger noted, a broad base of knowledge is important for CA practitioners. This mission, people-oriented and subjective by nature, defies most efforts to measure its effects. Contrary to a historical CA role, contemporary CMSE missions are not high-volume managers of projects and programs, nor does the DoD intend them to be. Combined with the short deployments of CA soldiers through individual CME missions, effects become nearly impossible to measure quantitatively. “The agency [USAID] has struggled with this for years. How do you measure a moving target?”<sup>85</sup> This ambiguity makes it more important that CA teams understand the effects they have on the local population instead of acting out of a desire to simply do good, or act against the first civil vulnerability they come across. SWCS offerings such as the Operational Design Course

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<sup>85</sup> USAID Civil-Military Cooperation Bureau member, interview by author, Washington, DC, 20 January 2016.

and Network Development Course allow tactical-level CA leaders to more effectively target their efforts in support of both interagency and military objectives.

### Summary

This research sought to analyze the effectiveness of CA and MG throughout history, and whether its doctrine supported the Army mission effectively. It seems that it has not. Colin Gray's claim that American warfare is "culturally challenged" is not without foundation.<sup>86</sup> American armies have not consistently consolidated their gains through effective and respectful dealings with local populations. Exceptions to the trend, such as Mexico and the Rhineland, have been the result of well-prepared and adaptive commanders, and not of a system at work.

The adoption of a dedicated staff function for CA, beginning in the Rhineland, improved the Army's linkages between commanders and occupied peoples. However, the capability to maintain a force of culturally astute Soldiers in peacetime, capable of filling a governance vacuum in the event of an occupation, never materialized. Doctrine for such activities was late in coming and unrealistic in its scope for what the Army could accomplish. In any event, the World Wars, Korea and Vietnam proved that civilian development professionals generally have a significant advantage in technical expertise and experience. When the military has been successful, it has drawn such professionals and academics directly into the service to serve the Army's needs.

During the Cold War, the best method of employing Army CA began to shift from MG to engagement. Limited war, kept so by nuclear deterrent, immediately made

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<sup>86</sup> Gray, 30.

popular support a more critical factor in accomplishing U.S. national security goals in revolutionary warfare. Army doctrine reflected this in the 1962 and 1968 versions of FM 100-5, but institutional emphasis on Special Warfare dimmed over the next four decades.

The relatively recent expansion of SOF CA, jump-started by war in Afghanistan and Iraq, provides the Army with a valuable tool to gain access to denied areas and influence local populations in ways never before possible. It is in alignment with the Army's operational vision for the coming years; a low-cost, small footprint, specialized force capable of helping to prevent and deter conflict in failing and failed states.

## GLOSSARY

Civil Affairs (CA). Designated AC and RC forces and units organized, trained, and equipped specifically to conduct civil affairs operations and to support CMO.<sup>87</sup>

Civil Military Engagement (CME). CME is a USSOCOM program of record established in 2008.<sup>88</sup> The program authorizes SOF CA to conduct persistent civil engagement in selected countries and areas. It is funded through Major Force Program-11, meaning the 95th CA Brigade is the only unit authorized to train, equip, deploy, and conduct operations under its auspices. The 85th CA Brigade, while also considered SOF CA, is not authorized to conduct CME program missions.

Civil Affairs Engagement Program (CAEP). A program established to allow joint CA forces to complement SOF CMSE in the conduct of CAO/CMO in the USSOUTHCOM area of responsibility to improve DoD's visibility, access, and influence in critical partner nations, generating long-term positive attitudes and goodwill for DoD (81st Civil Affairs Battalion).

Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC). An organization, normally comprised of CA, established to plan and facilitate coordination of activities of the Armed Forces of the United States within indigenous populations and institutions, the private sector, intergovernmental organizations, NGOs, multinational forces, and other governmental agencies in support of the joint force commander.<sup>89</sup>

Engagement. For the purposes of this research, engagement refers to that segment of the range of military operations encompassing FID, Security Forces Assistance, and Counterinsurgency.<sup>90</sup>

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<sup>87</sup> Headquarters, Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Reference Publication 1-02, *Terms and Military Symbols* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 7 December 2015), 1-14.

<sup>88</sup> U.S. Army Special Operations Command, Directive 525-38, 1.

<sup>89</sup> Director, Joint Staff, Joint Publication 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 8 November 2010, as amended through 15 February 2016), 33.

<sup>90</sup> U.S. Army Special Operations Command, "ARSOF 2022 Part II," U.S. Special Operations Command, 2014, accessed 10 April 2015, <http://www.soc.mil/Assorted%20Pages/ARSOF%202022%20Part%202.PDF>, 11.

Institute for Military Support to Governance (IMSG). The IMSG is an effort within the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy SWCS that will manage the provision of civil sector expertise across the range of military operations, to support USG obligations under international law and to promote stability. The IMSG will also support the TSOC, transitional military authorities and support to civil-administration operations as appropriate. Instrumental to the IMSG is the Military Governance Specialist program, Career Management Field 38G, which will enable the U.S. Army to leverage operational practitioners for critical civilian sector skill sets.<sup>91</sup> This program will allow CA generalists to rapidly provide civil sector expertise in undergoverned territories, in order to mitigate vulnerabilities.

Military Government (MG). Form of administration by which an occupying power exercises executive, legislative, and judicial authority over occupied territory.<sup>92</sup> This term is no longer in doctrinal use by the U.S. Army.

Special Operations Command- Forward (SOC-FWD). A SOC-FWD is normally smaller than a TSOC, and a tailored, operational-level HQ that provides a forward-deployed, persistent presence, and command and control capability.<sup>93</sup>

Theater Special Operations Command (TSOC). A subordinate unified command established by a combatant commander to plan, coordinate, conduct, and support joint SO.<sup>94</sup>

Title X Zones. Title X zones are regions in which the U.S. armed forces assume the lead. For the purposes of this research, Title X authorities should be assumed to mean DoD forces are operating in a counterterrorism capacity.

Title XXII Zones. Title XXII zones are regions in which the DoS and the U.S. ambassador assumes the lead for promoting U.S. interests, and the DoD is the supporting organization.

Undergoverned Area. An area in which a state faces significant challenges in establishing control within its own sovereign borders.

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<sup>91</sup> Ibid., 7.

<sup>92</sup> Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 41-10, *Civil Affairs Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 3 August 1967), 5.

<sup>93</sup> Director, Joint Staff, Joint Publication 3-05, *Special Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 16 July 2014), III-5.

<sup>94</sup> Ibid.

## APPENDIX A

### CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN A RESEARCH SURVEY

You are being asked to take part in a Master of Military Art and Science research study of how the Civil Affairs branch can maintain and improve quality of support to interagency missions. This research is being conducted by a student attending the Command and General Staff Officer Course. You are asked to take part because you have worked with Civil Affairs soldiers in ungoverned territories during “phase zero” operations. Please read this form carefully and ask any questions you may have before agreeing to take part in the study.

#### Purpose and Procedures of the Research Study

The purpose of this study is to record best practices for enhancing the effectiveness of Civil Affairs Teams/ Civil Military Support Elements when conducting SOF activities in ungoverned territories during phase zero and identify ways to increase DoS/DoD interoperability. The interview will include questions about your experience working with Army Civil Affairs, specifically interactions between Civil Affairs personnel and State Department employees in ungoverned territories. We will not discuss classified information and you are free to end the interview at any time. In accordance with DoDI 3216.02, *Protection of Human Subjects and Adherence to Ethical Standards in DoD-Supported Research*, all research material will be secured for three years.

#### Classification and UCMJ:

This thesis and interview will remain unclassified. Please do not provide any classified information in your statements or discuss any situation that may involve a legal violation.

#### Risks

I do not anticipate any risks to you participating in this study other than those encountered in day-to-day life.

#### Benefits

This is a research study and there is no expectation that you will receive any direct benefit from participation.

## Compensation

This is a research study and you will not receive any compensation from participation.

## Confidentiality

The records of this study will be kept private. The final thesis will not refer to you by name. Your duty position will be recorded in order to clarify the significance of your interview. The Human Subjects Protection Office or a DoD designee may inspect the records.

Every effort will be made to safeguard your confidentiality. If at any time you become uncomfortable and want to terminate the interview, you are free to do so and no portion of your interview will be used in this study. You will also be given the opportunity to review and approve your interview notes prior to its use in the study.

All data obtained about you, as an individual, will be considered privileged and held in confidence; you will not be identified in any presentation of the results. Complete confidentiality cannot be promised to subjects, particularly to subjects who are military personnel, because information bearing on your health may be required to be reported to appropriate authorities.

## Contacts for Additional Assistance

The researcher conducting this study is MAJ Thomas Geisinger. Please ask any questions you have now. If you have questions later, you may contact him at [thomas.geisinger@us.army.mil](mailto:thomas.geisinger@us.army.mil) or at 706-836-3206. If you have any questions or concerns regarding your rights as a subject in this study, please contact the CGSC Human Protections Administrator at [maria.l.clark.civ@mail.mil](mailto:maria.l.clark.civ@mail.mil).

## Voluntary Participation

Taking part in this study is completely voluntary. You may skip any questions that you do not want to answer. You will not be penalized in any way if you decide to withdraw from the study at any time. If you decide to take part, you are free to withdraw at any time. I will advise you of any developments during the study that might affect your decision to participate and offer an opportunity to withdraw from the study.

## Statement of Consent

I have read this form and its contents were explained. I agree to be in this research study for the purposes listed above. All of my questions were answered to my satisfaction. I

will receive a signed and dated copy of this form for my records. *This consent form will be kept by the researcher for at least three years beyond the end of the study.*

Please check one of the following statements:

- You may use my real name when using my data in publications or presentations.
- You may not use my real name. However, I realize that others might identify me based on the data, even though my name will not be used.

\_\_\_\_\_  
Signature of Research Subject

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Date

\_\_\_\_\_  
Printed Name of Research Subject

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Principal Investigator Signature

\_\_\_\_\_/\_\_\_\_\_/\_\_\_\_\_  
Date

**APPENDIX B**

**INTERVIEW QUESTIONS FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS  
FORCES CIVIL AFFAIRS TEAM MEMBERS**

**Research Question:** What best practices or measures of effects from other CME missions may be more widely applied to the CME program writ large?

1. What were the major “drivers of instability” or “civil vulnerabilities” in your assigned area? What were your target populations?
2. Was there a sector you targeted specifically (education, public health, etc.)? Why?
3. Did you feel able to impact drivers of instability in your assigned area? Why or why not?
4. What would have done differently if you were going back into the exact same situation?
5. What was your team’s greatest contribution to the overall mission? How would you measure it in terms of performance and effects?

**Secondary Research Question:** Is the CA Regiment preserving continuity of effort in its persistent presence missions?

1. How would you describe the changes to the mission between your team and the team that relieved you?

**Secondary Research Question:** Is the current guidance provided to CMSEs by Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOCs) sufficient to guide team leaders in the conduct of their missions?

1. What did your command structure look like? Who were your “bosses”?
2. Did this structure work well operationally? Did it cause unnecessary stress on the

- team or the mission as a whole?
3. What was your mission guidance? From which headquarters did it come?
  4. Was this guidance sufficient to the point that you felt able to execute Mission Command?
  5. How would you describe the working relationship with your in-country command team (e.g. a country team or distributed C2 node HQ)?
  6. Did you feel unnecessarily constrained from accomplishing your mission, either from home station or in country?

Secondary Research Question: Can the Civil Affairs regiment incorporate best practices from current CME missions into the Civil Affairs Qualification Course pipeline?

1. Looking back, what do you wish you had known before deploying?

Secondary Research Question: How can the CA Regiment better ensure that its teams are targeting their available resources to achieve maximum operational and strategic effect?

1. Now that you are more experienced, was this guidance sufficient to maximize your effectiveness in hindsight? Why or why not?
2. What would you say was your biggest asset to your supported effort while deployed? What could your team provide?
3. What was your biggest liability? What did you wish you had (training, equipment, personnel, etc.) that you did not have?

APPENDIX C

INTERVIEW QUESTIONS FOR DEPARTMENT OF STATE AND U.S.  
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PERSONNEL

Research Question: What best practices or measures of effects from other CME missions may be more widely applied to the CME program writ large?

1. Was the area's Civil Affairs (CA) team able to correctly assess civil vulnerabilities or drivers of instability affecting local populations?
2. Was the CA team able to effectively gain access to ungoverned spaces and map the human terrain?

Secondary Research Question: Is the CA Regiment preserving continuity of effort in its persistent presence missions?

1. Was the CA team in your area capable of contributing to and enabling the DoS mission

Secondary Research Question: Is the current guidance provided to CMSEs by Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOCs) sufficient to guide team leaders in the conduct of their missions?

1. What were the team's biggest strengths and weaknesses? What training or skills would have benefitted the team and made them more capable to augment your mission?

Secondary Research Question: Can the Civil Affairs regiment incorporate best practices from current CME missions into the Civil Affairs Qualification Course pipeline?

1. What were the major challenges to effective interagency cooperation in your mission?

Secondary Research Question: How can the CA Regiment better ensure that its teams are targeting their available resources to achieve maximum operational and strategic effect?

1. Are there significant changes to teams' approach as they rotate in and out of the mission?
2. In your own words, can you define "success" for a DoS partnership with a CA team?

APPENDIX D

U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE INTERVIEW RESPONSES

Research Question: What best practices or measures of effects from other CME missions may be more widely applied to the CME program writ large?

1. Was the CA team able to effectively gain access to ungoverned spaces and map the human terrain?

USAID REGIONAL DIRECTOR (2012): This is the competitive advantage that CA enjoys. CA has the ability to go where DoS/USAID representatives cannot or will not go. CA soldiers are usually smooth and diplomatic people who can easily build relationships with local leaders. I have a great deal of respect for the military and what they do. I have worked with many military teams in Iraq, Kenya, Yemen, Afghanistan, and in training in the United States, and found them to be almost uniformly good and talented people. They're studs! They bring an energy and dedication to the job that enables them to access ungoverned areas in semi-permissive environments.

USAID CIV-MIL BUREAU: Sure. CA teams do fill a gap within USAID, they are complementary to our own capabilities. It's unfortunate your manpower issues prevent you from operating in more countries, because I think there is a need there.

USAID DEPUTY DIRECTOR, GUATEMALA: Absolutely yes. CA teams build access that we often cannot because of your ability to work in more dangerous areas. The CA teams I have worked with have also been very focused on specific

local areas, which allows them to get to really know village elders, low-level government officials, etc.

**USAID REPRESENTATIVE ON U.S. COMBATANT COMMAND (COCOM)**

J9: In our area of operations, CA is critical to building access in semi-permissive areas. Security and development priorities intersect in these spaces, and CA is vital. We have cooperated in several locations, for example doing a number of rainwater harvesting projects to mitigate drivers of instability as well as relieve human suffering. We have some Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs) that we had worked with previously, so we put them in contact with the CA guys. They completely ran with it and now basically run that program.

2. In your own words, can you define “success” for a DoS partnership with a CA team?

**USAID REGIONAL DIRECTOR (2012):** CA teams are successful just by maintaining a presence in U.S. diplomatic missions, and a good relationship with partners like USAID. They build relationships over time and their quality will show through. But it's very important to remember the pace of State and military operations is very different; what I always tell military teams entering a diplomatic mission that you cannot go from “A” to “Zed” in the short time they are there. Getting from “A” to “B” is a success, and if you can set the next team up for success, that is so much the better. What this means in application is to limit the number and scope of projects; leave the really long stuff to USAID, where the academic expertise is. Short term projects in less secure environments, in direct support of USAID priorities, are a great fit for CA teams. I have

employed a method in the past is to establish a memorandum of agreement between the Agency and the affiliated CA team that the team will not undertake any projects without coordination with USAID and the mission director's approval. In exchange, I offer the mission's full support with their endeavors; I understand that while CA teams work with USAID, they work for another organization such as a Theater Special Operations Command. I think this is a good policy to reconcile the competing requirements.

USAID CIV-MIL BUREAU: Integrating more fully into mission priorities, and making tangible contributions to those objectives. We receive only haphazard outbriefs from teams at this office, although this is improving. That said, when one talks about measuring effects, I would ask "how do you measure a moving target"? I am honestly a little jaded by the question. This is something the agency has frankly struggled with for a long time. I will say that surveying and other methods of measuring public opinion or perception have to become more shared across the interagency community. We obviously have a number of tools we use for this purpose, the Military Information Support Teams (MISTs) have their own, and CA is developing their own as well. We have to share this critically valuable information. Also, when we discuss measures of effectiveness, I find that military teams including CA are still output focused whereas USAID is outcome focused. This is probably another offshoot of the short rotations, a desire to show that your team has been working to accomplish the mission, but we try not to evaluate missions on activities conducted, or patients treated.

USAID REPRESENTATIVE ON COCOM J9: I think one area where we could improve is in analytics. We sometimes work together, and if we can get there, everyone is happy. I do not think we take the necessary next step of evaluating what that cooperation gets us. Both agencies do a lot of data gathering, both sides want more to analyze, and from my seat at a COCOM, I do not see much evidence of CA or other military teams working with our Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) programs to get access. Maybe it is happening at individual missions, but I am not aware of it. There are benefits to this, as USAID could help design and implement CA surveys, with the results shared across all agencies. The other area is actual measures/indicators of success. We did ten rainwater harvesting projects. Is that good? Did we meet our goal? Were we as efficient with our resources as we could have been? I honestly do not know.

3. Was the CA team in your area capable of contributing to and enabling the DoS mission?

USAID DEPUTY DIRECTOR, GUATEMALA: I flew down for a CA medical outreach program near the Honduran border, and took a walk/private tour with the CA team leader. He also explained the local situation in regard to narcotics trafficking, and I learned this area was the linchpin for a local cartel's operation. This explained some of the supply and logistics trouble I had been having of late. So I would say there are situations where a CA team can provide a lot of value to USAID's mission. CA often has the best relationships with locals, sometimes more so than anyone in the embassy. I'm amazed at how generative some of those conversations are.

Secondary Research Question: Is the CA Regiment preserving continuity of effort in its persistent presence missions?

1. Was the area's Civil Affairs (CA) team able to correctly assess civil vulnerabilities or drivers of instability affecting local populations?

USAID CIV-MIL BUREAU: Your ability to operate in higher threat areas and conduct civil reconnaissance is valuable to the agency, but only when that information is shared systematically. For example, if I can go off on a tangent, I worked with a CA team in Ethiopia near the Somali border. They were able to gain access to a number of areas we desperately wanted to get into, but could not because of the risk involved. They were able to not only access the area, they were able to answer the question, "well, we've gained access, now what?" Their actions opened up a bad area and we were able to get aid into that area. When you have the right people on the ground, a team that knows what they are doing, the effects can be immense.

2. Are there significant changes to teams' approach as they rotate in and out of the mission?

USAID REGIONAL DIRECTOR (2012): This is my chief complaint about CA teams in-country: the deployments are too short to accomplish anything of note. It's enervating to our diplomats to get to know a team, their personalities, and their unique strengths and have them leave a handful of months later. I think if we are talking about improvements to the CME program, any serious conversation starts there.

**USAID CIV-MIL BUREAU:** The deployments are too short! 6-8 months is simply not enough. I understand the reasons, but I stress that those reasons should be reevaluated. Because you work on that model, I question the idea that continuity is even possible. Teams that come through the bureau often don't know what prior teams have done, and it seems as if they expect USAID to know their operations and fill the gaps for them. They often don't have a plan before coming in to interagency week, let alone before getting into country. This is not, by definition, continuity of any sort. Teams must not simply know that country X is impoverished and borders four other nations, they have to get deeper! Build a strategy from day one. When the knowledge and preparation is clearly lacking, it makes us question whether that particular team is serious or not. I need to qualify that and say many teams are well prepared, but it still goes to the overall perception of CA by USAID and State. This is why I would suggest that Washington (USAID headquarters) has a generally negative view of CA teams. Fortunately, we are a field-centric organization.

3. What were the team's biggest strengths and weaknesses? What training or skills would have benefitted the team and made them more capable of contributing to your mission?

**USAID REGIONAL DIRECTOR (2012):** It's important to remember that USAID doesn't really "need" CA; the agency has a lot of well-educated professionals who are experts in various development fields. CA teams don't really have a realistic chance of matching that expertise. But you bring with you an optimism and energy that allows you to break down barriers, build trust, and accomplish your

mission. To augment that attitude, we have taken some measures to improve educational opportunities for DoD and USAID members to work and learn together. The Development in Vulnerable Environments (DIVE) program is teaching CA students to more effectively communicate using USAID's language, and better orient them to our operations and capabilities.

Another "weakness", although I hesitate to use such a strong term, is that CA teams do not always sell their capabilities and assets very well. As I said, teams cannot offer a serious contribution in terms of development knowledge, economic aid, etc. But you have access to the military's expansive transportation network to move humanitarian aid, a powerful "reachback" capability to bring veterinary, medical, and other professionals into country to accomplish certain tasks, and the training to move about in more dangerous environments. It is true we have more development money available than your teams, but your ability to reach back into your institution to get people and resources, and the relative speed with which you can do it, is unmatched.

USAID CIV-MIL BUREAU: The teams are generally very personable and tactful- they're smooth. They also usually know what their role is and explain it well. And as we discussed, they have the ability to go into less permissive areas to build relationships and gain access. In particular, the training appears to be where it needs to be. I went down to Fort Bragg and was able to observe with some of the [Urban Reaction Facilities] that teach rapid reaction to stressful situations. Everyone from USAID came away very impressed that those skills are trained so intensively. As far as skills and capabilities to improve, I'm not sure that CA

teams, In Guatemala and elsewhere, always study the broader picture in enough detail to show the country team they can be trusted to operate independently. I also think the language capability of CA and other military teams is a little oversold; teams do not seem to align on their language and regional specialty very often. I freely admit that USAID has some of the same problems, but it negates an opportunity to add that cultural and language skill to the mission. Most CA troops are not capable of conversing in their trained language as well. Lastly, I'll offer that sometimes CA teams do not have their "elevator pitch" properly discussed beforehand. Teams will sometimes come to our office, and one member will tell us they are here to support the U.S. ambassador in health and education matters. Another member of the same team, in the same room, will say they are there to get access to specific areas of interest to their military commanders. It can appear disingenuous.

USAID DEPUTY DIRECTOR, GUATEMALA: A good question, because there is talent there on CA teams, it's sometimes difficult to use it.

Secondary Research Question: Can the Civil Affairs regiment incorporate best practices from current CME missions into the Civil Affairs Qualification Course pipeline?

1. What were the major challenges to effective interagency cooperation in your mission?

USAID REGIONAL DIRECTOR (2012): We speak different languages. It's still baffling to me as a senior diplomat that has worked with the military for much of my career. Cross-training like DIVE, District Stability Framework (DSF), and other training programs have helped to bridge the gap, but there is still a lot of

ground to cover. Another thing we need to do is fix the attitudes. USAID has a lot of inexperienced people, albeit with elite educational credentials. Much of their past work experience comes from the Peace Corps and that sometimes leads to mistrust of the military's motives, regardless of the mission or the individual. I'll say this, CA teams are excellent, the best in the DoD, at winning these kinds of folks over, but it's a slow process. When I was a Mission Director in country, I directed all of my subordinate program directors to work with all of our military teams, especially CA. They had carte blanche to meet with the program directors and find areas to cooperate and integrate. To refuse to work with the military was to imperil their own position at the mission, so we saw some progress on that front. I think leaders on both sides need to push just a little harder to make this happen because it benefits everyone.

USAID CIV-MIL BUREAU: I think part of the problem is that USAID feels like CA teams just show up on their doorstep sometimes. There is no interagency voice in the planning process in where CA teams are placed, what missions receive them. This leads to some of the perception in Washington I spoke of earlier. I understand the military has control over the process of deciding which missions receive CA support, but certainly there is room for discussion. That would be a great gesture of cooperation. I also feel as if the Civil-Military Advisory Group rotates too often to really build the kind of relationships your community is looking for. We actually stopped issuing them badges because their turnover rate was so high it was no longer economical.

**USAID DEPUTY DIRECTOR, GUATEMALA:** It's so frustrating that you are only here for six months, or however long it is. It's fun, the CA guys are social and eager to reach out, and then they are gone. It just is not practical. Your approaches also vary so greatly from team to team. I guess that is something simply based on personality, but that really becomes a negative, again, when you are here for such a brief amount of time. Another barrier to good cooperation is that we don't always seem to get the benefits of your access and relationships, just as you don't always get ours. Reporting chains create these "silos of expertise". There is also a lack of trust sometimes with USAID officers, particularly first or second tour officers, who can see CA as an intelligence collection activity. They wonder why the military is in a country with no war, and in plain clothes, and handing out business cards with a gmail.com address on them. I mistrusted them at first as well, and CA teams need to make sure they are presenting themselves in the right way to avoid misunderstandings.

**USAID REPRESENTATIVE ON COCOM J9:** The short nature of CA deployments is a constant complaint among USAID. It is certainly not ideal, but we have some measures in place to mitigate it. I have good contacts within the SO CA battalion aligned to my COCOM, and we have frequent conversations to introduce people on the ground to each other and help facilitate relationships. I am also happy with the regionally aligned battalion from the 85<sup>th</sup> CA brigade, they do a great job with their engagements and are frequently communicating with my office.

2. What can the Civil Affairs regiment do to improve its product at the individual mission level?

USAID REGIONAL DIRECTOR (2012): The product is already very good! As I said, the CA guys are studs. They bring a lot of energy and they genuinely want to work hard and with interagency partners. But you don't sell it. There are very few CA folks in Washington coordinating activities. CA isn't at the Foreign Service Institute; they aren't getting in on the ground floor. You need to find ways to increase the amount of interagency facetime your officers get, and increase the length of that facetime.

USAID CIV-MIL BUREAU: We need to find ways to make the teams integrate into the upper levels of the mission. CA team leaders are your most inexperienced people, working alongside career development professionals and diplomats. I think individual teams need some form of representation or introduction from their more senior officers. The Bureau of Civ-Mil Cooperation tried this for a time, writing joint letters to mission directors on behalf of CA teams, but it was very taxing given the number of missions and rate of turnover. Maybe the idea was right but we could execute it another way? Mission handovers also need to become more thorough; I've seen several cases where teams clearly did not receive adequate guidance from the predecessors about the country team's priorities or their own, which led to the team essentially starting over from a project standpoint. Lastly, we need to increase the amount of cross-training we do with the military, and vice versa. So many of our junior personnel do not know what to do with a CA team, they are not prepared to do business with you. I think

one fix for that would be to catch them when they arrive. If you cannot put CA representatives in training with new officers, have CA teams in country brief each incoming officer as they report to the mission. We have long checklists to complete for new arrivals, why not have the front office add a briefing from the local CA team? Host new arrivals at the CA house for a brief chat and build some familiarity and trust.

USAID REPRESENTATIVE ON COCOM J9: I am actually a really big proponent for CA, it is a great program. My biggest issues are mainly with the Pacific Partnership program and the Navy's role in engagement. They have a tendency to just push capabilities forward without any regard to the effects they might create, or if our interests would be better served by placing them elsewhere. When the hospital ships are planning an outreach program, for example, they presuppose where they are going and what they are doing, and only ask for help in identifying who needs surgery or medicine. That's a lot of capability to not have a conversation about how it is applied. Are we thinking about tribal or ethnic divides? Are we thinking about gender issues? I wish we could get them away from direct care and aid and move toward medical training instead. I have found this is not the case with CA teams, who generally understand the environments in which they operate. If CA wants to improve their performance in the area, one thing I might suggest is that the reservists are not as well prepared as they might be to conduct these missions. The few misunderstandings I have had with CA have not been from the active-duty teams and staff officers, but reservists. They sometimes make some waves with USAID because they do not fully understand

the programming and become insistent they should partner with the agency on things in which we are not necessarily interested.

## APPENDIX E

### SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES CIVIL AFFAIRS INTERVIEW RESPONSES

Secondary Research Question: Can the Civil Affairs regiment incorporate best practices from current CME missions into the Civil Affairs Qualification Course pipeline?

1. Looking back, what do you wish you had known before deploying?

COL (R) YOUMANS: When I was assigned to the 29<sup>th</sup> CA Company and deployed to Vietnam, I actually felt well prepared. I had about a year to train and get ready for deployment. After CA School at Fort Gordon, I went to a course taught by the U.S. Information Agency on cross-cultural communications. I had the opportunity to take an 80-hour medical course at Fort Lee – we did lots of medical training, both for protecting ourselves and taking care of the needs of the people [of Vietnam]. A few us got to go to a four-week contracted course at Princeton on how to conduct area studies, which I found valuable. To get back to your question, I wish we had known how to get involved in the intel picture. Not so much in collecting information, but in receiving it. We needed to know where the dislocated civilians were, where the populations needed a road to connect farms to markets. What you now call Civil Information Management did not exist at the time. Not only could we not use intelligence to protect our teams, we could not use it to do our job effectively.

Secondary Research Question: How can the CA Regiment better ensure that its teams are targeting their available resources to achieve maximum operational and strategic effect?

CA TEAM LEADER, GUATEMALA: I feel our team was pretty well prepared for what we were doing, between CA training and pre-mission training. I do wish

we had better education and training on the interagency organizations working in our area, however. It was sometimes difficult to coordinate with USAID and DoS because we were not sufficiently read in to their priorities. We had copies of all the relevant guidance like the Mission Strategic Plan, the Theater Security Cooperation Plan, etc., but the more specific lines of effort by the interagency folks were not clear to us on a day to day basis. As it turned out, our goals and USAID's were sometimes at cross purposes, as they focused primarily on relieving human suffering with things like food aid, and we were more focused on supporting SOCSOUTH objectives like identifying which villages. We need a more robust program for linking into interagency programming and we need to train our people to more skillfully find common ground with those partners.

COL (R) YOUMANS: We have to understand the purpose of CA. The Army has to decide. Do we want the capability to completely take on Military Government responsibilities? Do we want to support the local U.S. military commander? Do we want to be able to effectively support the host nation government?

[Interviewer asks for clarification] Can you elaborate? It sounds like you're describing doctrinal changes to help CA teams drive operations.

COL (R) YOUMANS: Yes. Goldwater-Nichols in particular drove everything as far as CA doctrine and what we were supposed to do. When I was assigned to the 96<sup>th</sup> CA Group in 1967, our doctrine was still to go into a country and make it America- military government. We knew at the time that wasn't practical, but it persisted in doctrine for a long time. Years later, when I was assigned to USSOCOM at the Pentagon, we went through a lot of the doctrinal fights that

integrated CA in the SOF community. When I was deployed to Panama by USSOCOM, we had a lot of Reserve CA colonels down there that thought the best move was to establish a military government- that was incompatible with the scope of the mission though. First, the USG had no interest in staying for as long as it would take to establish and run a military government. We stood up a Military Support Group to Panama and it remained active for about a year. Congress told us they would earmark \$500 million to the effort, that eventually became \$80 million. I had a discussion with the Assistant Secretary of State for Latin Affairs and asked him what the desired endstate for Panama was, what he wanted to see happen. I could not get a straightforward answer. With funds always running short, we had to devolve our projects to relatively superficial stuff like keeping clinics open and providing essential services.

To try to round it back to your question, CA teams should know what their endstate is, but they should also know what they can and cannot affect. In Somalia, for example, I think our humanitarian goals were unrealistic. Famine is endemic there based on the geography and demographics. There were major humanitarian operations in 1961 in response to famine caused by major flooding. If we intended to do anything beyond relieve immediate human suffering, we were overreaching.

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